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Abstract
Cyber-crime Science is an emerging area of study aiming
to prevent cyber-crime by combining security protection
techniques from Information Security with empirical re-
search methods used in Crime Science. Information se-
curity research has developed techniques for protecting
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of informa-
tion assets but is less strong on the empirical study of the
effectiveness of these techniques. Crime Science studies
the effect of crime prevention techniques empirically in
the real world, and proposes improvements to these tech-
niques based on this. Combining both approaches, Cyber-
crime Science transfers and further develops Information
Security techniques to prevent cyber-crime, and empir-
ically studies the effectiveness of these techniques in the
real world. In this paper we review the main contributions
of Crime Science as of today, illustrate its application to
a typical Information Security problem, namely phishing,
explore the interdisciplinary structure of Cyber-crime Sci-
ence, and present an agenda for research in Cyber-crime
Science in the form of a set of suggested research ques-
tions.
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page abbreviation concept
8 ACM Association of Computing Machinery
9 BotNet collection of computers programmed to attack on a massive scale
16 CCTV Closed Circuit Television
16 CO Carbon Monoxide
8 CRAVED Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, and Disposable
8 CSP Cloud Service Provider
28 DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
22 DEA Disposable Email Address
9 DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
19 GIS Geographic Information System
13 IDS Intrusion Detection System
17 IEEE Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers
33 IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
33 INSAFEHANDS Identifiable, Neutral, Seen, Attached, Findable, Executable, Hidden, Automatic, Nec-
essary, Detectable, and Secure
9 IP Internet Protocol
5 IRC Internet Relay Chat
4 ISP Internet Service Provider
3 IT Information Technology
17 LNCS Lecture Notes in Computer Science
9 MAC Media Access Control
28 Online Polling using computers and the Internet for an opinion poll
17 RCT Randomized Controlled Trial
23 reshipper someone who is prepared to receive and reship goods in exchange for a fee
11 RFID Radio Frequency IDentification
33 SCAREM Stealth, Challenge, Anonymity, Reconnaissance, Escape, and Multiplicity
8 SLA Service Level Agreement
17 SOUPS Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
22 URL Uniform Resource Locator
33 VIVA high Value, low Inertia, high Visibility and easy Access
28 Online Voting using computers and the Internet for casting and counting votes in elections
5 WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
23 zero-day attack an attack that has just been discovered, but for which no defence is available yet
Table 1: Glossary
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1 Introduction
Crime Science has been developed as a reaction to the dif-
ficulty of traditional Criminology in effectively preventing
and controlling crime. Criminology intends to explain the
“why” of offending and usually investigates the behaviour
of adolescents and its roots. Now we know that deeper,
longer-term causes of crime cannot easily be changed and
therefore, Criminology has had little impact on behaviour
and on the prevention of crime [64, 130, 224]. Crime Sci-
ence, in contrast is interested in explaining the short term
causes of offending and the “how” of offending [66]. The
focus of Crime Science is on the opportunity for crime.
Crime Science relies on multidisciplinary, contextual, and
evidence based research, directing towards practical solu-
tions and prevention. This sets it apart from Criminol-
ogy, which focuses on the criminal, his history, and trans-
generational background, and on the long-term causes of
criminal behaviour.1
In its short history, Crime Science has delivered on its
promise of fast and effective scientific approach for the
prevention of crime [160, 219, 251]. We can describe
Crime Science by means of seven characteristics [219]:
1. In contrast to criminology, Crime Science studies in-
cidents, not persons. For example, Crime Science
investigates when and were burglaries happen and
not the personality of burglars or their family or
school background. Crime Science does investigate,
however, what the short-term motives are of bur-
glars, such as: why an offender chooses a particular
dwelling or a particular time to burgle or what to
search for;
2. Crime Science in essence is a problem oriented sci-
entific approach, and presents a model for find-
ing ways to prevent concrete mishaps, disorders or
crime, but also accidents in medication [75, 98], pub-
lic health [222, 187], and personal safety [127, 189].
Crime Science is therefore outcome oriented, direct,
and specific;
3. Crime Science research methods include target sur-
veys, geographical surveys, and case studies that in-
vestigate how specific interventions affect crime;
4. Crime Science makes use of a conceptual framework
consisting of the Rational Choice Perspective, the
Routine Activity Approach, and Crime Pattern The-
ory (see Section 3.1 for details);
1The term Crime Science was coined in the 1990s by the BBC
broadcaster Nick Ross. The ten pioneers of Crime Science are Pa-
tricia and Paul Brantingham, Ronald Clarke, Paul Ekblom, Mar-
cus Felson, Gloria Laycock, Ken Pease, Nick Ross, Nick Tilley, and
Richard Wortley.
5. By empirically investigating incidents, Crime Science
tries to explain incidents by postulating rules and
patterns that have led to these incidents, aspiring to
understand how this knowledge can be used to pre-
vent or control crime, mishaps, accidents, disorder,
etc;
6. By definition Crime Science is a multidisciplinary
field. The aim of Crime Science is to understand
and prevent crime by whatever methods necessary,
using methods from whatever discipline. For exam-
ple, Crime Science makes use, amongst others, of
knowledge and methods of Geography, Urban Devel-
opment, Mathematics, Industrial Design, Construc-
tion Engineering, Medical Science, Economics, Com-
puter Science, Psychology, Sociology, Criminology,
Law, and Public Management;
7. Potential users come from a large variety of fields:
all professionals active in the field of crime prevention
and disorder, such as policemen, policymakers, urban
planners, managers, and architects are Crime Science
users.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: (1) to add Infor-
mation Security to the already impressive list of sources
of methods of Crime Science, and (2) to add Information
Technology (IT) architects to the list of users of the re-
sults of Crime Science. Crime Science thus enhanced and
used is called Cyber-Crime Science in this paper.
To substantiate these contributions we seek to answer
two questions:
• Which techniques from Information Security can be
used to prevent and detect cyber-crime or crime in
general?
• Can the empirical research methods of Crime Science
be used to investigate the effectiveness of Information
Security techniques?
Perhaps we should explain why we are interested in the
effectiveness of Information Security. The reason is that
many well intended policies are often ignored or simply
too costly to implement. The classical example is the user
who is forced to choose a strong password that he cannot
remember. As a consequence the user writes the password
on a yellow sticky and attaches the sticky to his screen.
Another example is given by Herley who estimates that
the cost of Phishing is probably dwarfed by the burden
on the users who are asked to comply with much well
intended advice designed to stop phishing [132]. To make
Information security more effective, economic and human
factors must be taken into account.
We will analyse the relation between Information Secu-
rity and prevention of cyber-crime first, and then return
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to the seven items above to analyse the synthesis of In-
formation Security and Crime Science into Cyber-crime
Science.
In our analysis, we make a number of suggestions for
future research that we will summarize at the end of this
paper in the form of a research programme for Cyber-
crime Science.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce and discuss the definitions of the main concepts
used in this paper. In Section 3 we review the theory
and practise of Crime Science from an Information Se-
curity perspective. In Section 4 we show that there are
only a few cyber-crime prevention studies in the Com-
puter Science literature. In Section 5 we apply the ideas
from Crime Science to cyber-crime. Section 6 discusses
the relationship between Information Security, and the
disciplines that are most closely related from a crime pre-
vention point of view, which are Computational Social
Science, Economics, and Law. Section 7 presents an anal-
ysis of the most important practical issue: getting the
cooperation for cyber-crime prevention of the most im-
portant stakeholders, such as government and industry.
The last section concludes and sets the research agenda
for the area of Cyber-crime Science.
2 Definitions
We start with definitions of a number of terms used
throughout the paper.
Crime. There are two definitions of crime, providing a
subjective and an objective view of crime. A subjectivist
definition of crime is that it is an act of force or fraud
undertaken in pursuit of self interest [118]. This is a sub-
jectivist definition because it includes self-interest in the
concept of crime. This is useful if we want to study be-
haviour that tends to be disapproved of by society and is
morally or legally wrong.
For the purpose of this paper we will however use an
objectivist definition from criminal law [211]: A crime is
behaviour that is commonly considered harmful to indi-
viduals and/or society.
Disorder. Crime Science does not limit itself to crime
defined in the legal way, but is also interested in disorder.
Disorder is a broader concept than crime and consists of
observable physical and social cues that are commonly
perceived to disturb the civil and unencumbered use of
public space [194]. This includes crime, but it also in-
cludes for example cigarettes on the street, garbage, litter,
empty bottles, and graffiti. Examples of social disorder
are adults loitering or congregating, people drinking al-
cohol, and prostitution. Sampson and Raudenbush [194]
argue that signs of disorder are commonly perceived as
disturbing by all members of the public.
Crime Science. From the work of the ten pioneers of
Crime Science, the following definition of Crime Science
emerged [160, 188]: Crime Science is the application of
the methods of Science to the prevention or detection of
disorder, in particular of crime.
Cyber-crime. Newman defines cyber-crime as be-
haviour in which computers or networks are a tool, a tar-
get, or a place of criminal activity [183]. This includes the
subject of interest of Information Security, namely tech-
niques to prevent or detect attacks on information assets,
but it is broader because it also includes such topics as
the use of computers to commit “traditional” crime.
It is possible that in the future, cyber-crime will turn
out to be nothing special. Something similar has hap-
pened before, with the introduction of new technology:
The industrial revolution urbanised crime, which the law
enforcement of the day was unable to cope with [43]. This
eventually led to the introduction of the modern police
force. It is possible that the information revolution will
have a significant effect on law enforcement too. However,
before cyber-crime is subsumed by the definition of crime,
there are some significant challenges to be met. For exam-
ple Locard’s exchange principle, which is the foundation
of Forensics, does not seem to apply to cyber-crime scene
investigation [131, Chapter 10].
Information Security. Finally, to complete our set of
definitions we will use the following definition from the
US Code Title 44 Chapter 35, subchapter III, §3542: In-
formation Security is the protection of information and
information systems from unauthorized access, use, dis-
closure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order
to provide integrity, confidentiality, and availability.
2.1 Analysing the definitions
Based on the definitions of cyber-crime and Information
Security above we can see that there is a significant over-
lap between cyber-crime and breaches of Information Se-
curity. If a cyber-crime occurs, then, by the definition
above, computers or networks must have been used as a
tool, a target, or a place of criminal activity. Since the
only purpose of computers and networks is the manipu-
lation of information, the occurrence of a cyber-crime is
usually related to a breach of Information Security. By
a breach of Information Security we understand either
breaking a security mechanism or violating a security pol-
icy. For example, acts such as cyber-bullying and cyber-
stalking would normally be forbidden by the security pol-
icy of an Internet Service Provider (ISP), hence we can
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speak of a breach of Information Security. Cyber-bullying
and cyber-stalking are clearly crimes. All common forms
of cyber-crime, i.e. cyber-trespass, cyber-deceptions and
thefts, cyber-pornography, and cyber-violence [254] typi-
cally involve a breach of Information Security.
Despite this large overlap between cyber-crime and In-
formation Security, there are also differences. To improve
our understanding we will analyse these differences. First,
there are cyber-crimes that do not involve a breach of In-
formation Security.
A good example is blue box phone fraud [91], which
works as follows. First, the offender dials a low tariff local
number, then activates the blue box, and finally selects a
high tariff long distance number. The call is charged at
the low tariff, thus defrauding the telephone company by
the difference between the two tariffs. The fraud exploits
a fundamental design problem of the phone system of the
1950’s, which assumed that callers would never generate
signalling information in the voice channel, thus allowing
the phone system to carry voice and signalling on the
same channel. The current phone systems use out-of-band
signalling to render blue boxes inoperative. US Code Title
18, Part I, Chapter 63, §1343 “Fraud by wire, radio, or
television” from 1958 imposes a maximum fine of US $
1,000 on blue box fraud.
One could say that while one discipline of Cyber-crime
Science (i.e. Information Security) failed to act, another
discipline of Cyber-crime Science (i.e. the Law) did act.
Blue box fraud therefore falls within the broad interpre-
tation of Cyber-crime Science. There are more examples
of this kind, but we believe that the innovative charac-
ter of the example suggests that the blue box category of
incidents will eventually be subsumed by Information Se-
curity. Anticipating this development, we give a broad in-
terpretation to Cyber-crime Science so as to include cases
like blue box fraud.
Second, there are breaches of Information Security that
are not crimes. For example, suppose that a boss shares
his username and password with his secretary so that
she can deal with his email during his holidays. In this
case the boss has violated a security policy, and has thus
breached Information Security. An honest secretary will
not misuse the trust placed in her, but even if she does
commit minor offenses, the principle of “de minimis non
curat lex” (i.e. the law does not deal with trifles) en-
sures that the legal system ignores those events. In any
case, this is a case of mild disorder that falls under the
province of Crime Science, and hence, in this example, of
Cyber-crime Science.
Returning to cyber-crime that involves a breach of In-
formation Security, we should note that computers and
networks themselves can be criminogenic, meaning that
they can provide new opportunities for crime, that do not
exist without computers or networks, and which Infor-
mation Security seeks to prevent. Already in 1982, Jay
Becker, then head of the US National Centre for computer
crime data hypothesised that “Environment, not person-
ality seems the most useful factor in predicting and pre-
venting computer crime” [17]. In the Crime Science lit-
erature, the environment that Becker refers to is called
the “opportunity structure”. We have not found a follow
up on Becker’s work in literature on Information Security.
We believe this to be due to the fact that only now, the
state of the art in Crime Science is sufficiently developed
to start testing Becker’s hypothesis.
Becker’s paper [17] is the earliest reference in the Com-
puter Science literature that mentions the word crimino-
genic. Here we give some examples of more recent papers
that focus on the criminogenic properties of computers
and networks. Marshall and Tompsett [169] describe how
in one major benefit fraud identities were created using
aggregators like http://www.192.com/. The Internet is
replete with identity information, making life easy for the
scammers [182]. McCarty [171] describes how “carders”
(i.e. offenders that specialise in offenses with credit cards)
use Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels to conduct their
illegitimate business. McEwen [172] shows how crimino-
genic the mobile phone is in the drug trade. The concept
of a “burner” is interesting, i.e. a mobile phone that is
thrown away after having been used in drug trafficking.
Slay and Turnbull [203] describe how in the early days of
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), most people were
negligent about security, such that others could use their
access point for criminal purposes. The paper reports on
cases of WLAN access point owners who got into serious
trouble because of their negligence. Most of the offenders
were caught because they did not think about hiding their
actions. Computers and networks thus provide significant
opportunity for crime and Information Security in general
seeks to prevent these opportunities.
Summarizing, all breaches of Information Security are
examples of crime or disorder and hence examples of
cyber-crime in the broad sense. While there are some
examples of cyber-crime that do not involve breaches of
Information Security such examples are not the focus of
this paper. In the rest of this paper, we explore how the
synthesis of Information Security research with Crime Sci-
ence research can enrich both fields.
2.2 Cyber-crime Science
Cyber-crime Science combines the methodology of Crime
Science with the technology of Information Security. To
clarify what we mean by this, we refine the seven charac-
teristics of Crime Science into the characteristics of Cyber-
crime Science, by adding the Information Security per-
spective.
1. Like Crime Science, Information Security is not in-
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terested in the personality of the offender, but is in-
terested in the incidents, such as violated security
policies, broken security protocols, hacked web sites,
guessed passwords, cloned smart cards etc. In this re-
spect, Cyber-crime Science and Information Security
research have always been similar.
2. Like Crime Science, Information Security is problem-
oriented and focuses on ways to prevent concrete in-
cidents (such as hacking a web site). Information
Security is “crime” specific. For example, all well de-
signed security protocols make specific assumptions
about the power of the attacker and the threat model
(i.e. the list of possible attacks that are being con-
sidered). By aiming to prevent or detect specific
outcomes, Information Security research is outcome-
oriented. Here too Cyber-crime Science and Informa-
tion Security research have always been similar.
3. However, unlike Crime Science, Information Security
research does not normally study the outcome of In-
formation Security breaches empirically. Applying
the empirical research methods of Crime Science to
study the effects of Information Security techniques
in practice should contribute to making the use of
these techniques more effective. This is an enrich-
ment of Information Security research that is dis-
cussed further in Section 5.
4. Information security research does not have a concep-
tual framework for criminal or disorderly behaviour
like that of Crime Science. We will show in Section
3.1 that the conceptual framework of Crime Science
provides useful guidelines for Information Security.
The Rational Choice Perspective is fundamental to
the Economics of Information Security and Privacy;
we will discuss this in detail in Section 6.2. There is
a role for the Routine Activity Approach [254, 138]
and Crime Pattern Theory too, but there is a signif-
icant difference between cyber-crime and traditional
crime that has a large influence on the conceptual
framework of Crime Science: the notions of time and
space in the physical world are different from those
in cyber-space. We believe that further research is
needed to refine a number of existing theories to
cyber-crime. This is a significant further develop-
ment, which is discussed in Section 6.1;
5. Unlike Crime Science, Information Security research
does not investigate incidents to identify rules and
patterns of human behaviour that explain the oc-
currence of these incidents. Rather, Information Se-
curity develops new techniques to prevent and de-
tect security breaches, and investigates the proper-
ties of these techniques, aspiring to understand how
they work in practice and how they can be improved
further. This can enrich the proposals to prevent
cyber-crime based on empirical research of incidents
in Crime Science.
6. Like Crime Science, Information Security is a mul-
tidisciplinary field. Information Security is inti-
mately related to Mathematics, but also Physics [24],
Law [209], Economics [9], and Psychology [195]. Our
proposed discipline of Cyber-crime Science relates
Crime Science to Information Security. As far as we
can see, Information Security does not link to Geog-
raphy, which as we have already mentioned in item 5
above is an area of future research.
7. Like Crime Science, potential users of Information
Security come from a variety of fields, such as the
security industry, the police, governments, and busi-
nesses.
Summarising, Cyber-crime Science and Information Se-
curity research can mutually enrich each other in the area
of Cyber-crime Science.
An appropriate framework for this is the schema of
empirical evaluation research presented by Pawson &
Tilley [186]:
Context & Treatment causes Outcome.
• The context is the environment in which opportuni-
ties for crime exist.
• The treatment consists of the application of tech-
niques aiming to prevent crime.
• The outcome is the result of applying the treatment
in a specific, concrete context.
In the approach by Pawson & Tilley, empirical investiga-
tion of outcomes in Crime Science is done by case stud-
ies. The aim of these studies is to understand the specific
mechanisms that in this concrete case have caused the
treatment, which in this context to lead to this outcome.
The ambition is to find generalisable, reusable knowledge
by identifying generic mechanisms that can be predicted
to occur in other cases too.
In Cyber-crime Science, this approach is combined with
the approach of Information Security research to develop
treatments, i.e. techniques to prevent or detect Infor-
mation Security breaches. Cyber-crime Science studies
the effect of these treatments in concrete cases using the
research methods and conceptual framework of Crime
Science and proposes improvements to these treatments
based on the insights gained by this research.
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3 Crime Science from an Informa-
tion Security perspective
The components of Crime Science are:
1. A conceptual framework;
2. A set of opportunity-reducing techniques;
3. Knowledge about a body of evaluated practice;
4. Studies of displacement of crime and diffusion of ben-
efits.
We summarize the prominent aspects of each of these
in the following four sections, mainly using examples from
Information Security.
3.1 Conceptual framework
Crime Science researchers have developed a conceptual
framework that consists of three perspectives on the crime
incident. These three perspectives operate at different
levels, which, following Felson and Clarke [97], we will
present top down:
• The Routine Activity Approach operates at the level
of society or a large organisation. The main question
is how to discover and prevent opportunities for crime
in the routine activities of potential offenders.
• Crime Pattern Theory operates at the level of every-
day life of an individual offender, and his location.
The main question is how to discover and prevent op-
portunities for crime in the daily commute and other
patterns of movement of potential offenders.
• the Rational Choice Perspective operates at the level
of a specific crime opportunity, focusing on the cost
benefit tradeoffs presented by the opportunity. The
main question is to measure and influence the cost
benefit tradeoffs that underlie crime.
The three perspectives can be used to understand and ex-
plain opportunity for crime at each of these levels, and
they can be used to design preventive measures that re-
duce this opportunity. We discuss the three perspectives
in the next three sections, followed by a discussion of a
closely related issue: Repeat Victimization.
3.1.1 Routine Activity Approach
The first perspective is the Routine Activity Ap-
proach [71], which states that the opportunity for crime is
most likely to present itself during routine activities, when
(1) a potential offender meets (2) a suitable target in the
absence of (3) a capable guardian. We will discuss each
of these three actors below, starting with the potential
offender.
A potential offender is the main actor of crime.
Many individuals in modern society are potential offend-
ers [68, 118, 223]. For example when there is little su-
pervision or likelihood of detection, people are vulnerable
to temptations [96]. An important reason for Crime Sci-
ence to stress prevention is that the reservoir of potential
offenders is virtually unlimited.
An insider is privy to more information than an out-
sider and has thus better opportunities to commit a crime.
Therefore, Information Security emphasizes the distinc-
tion between insiders and outsiders. The Information Se-
curity literature is replete with papers on insider threats,
dating back to at least Dorothy Denning’s seminal paper
in 1987 [79]. The idea of separating offenders into a pow-
erful class of insiders and a less powerful class of outsiders
is in principle attractive, as one can focus effort on the
class of offenders that are considered to pose the high-
est risk. Once the two classes of offenders are separated,
one may try to refine the class of insiders into subclasses.
For example Wood [250] theorises about certain charac-
teristics of insiders, but without any empirical evidence,
and Theoharidou et al [217] examine various social and
criminological theories, including those discussed here, as
a basis for containing the insider threat. Neumann [181]
provides an older but still valid overview of the challenges
of preventing insider attacks. Finally Caputo et al [55] de-
scribe an experiment in the spirit of Crime Science where
in a randomized controlled trial the difference between
benign and malicious insiders is studied.
Willison explores in a series of papers how Crime Sci-
ence can be applied to computer assisted insider fraud.
His first paper [243] describes the actions of Nick Lee-
son that lead to the collapse of Barings bank. The main
conclusion is that lack of a capable guardian contributed
most to the collapse of the bank. A series of three pa-
pers [245, 246, 244] propose the idea to perform risk as-
sessment of information systems from the perspective of
the insider/offender (instead of the more common per-
spective of the target). The papers do not offer an empir-
ical validation of the idea. A series of two papers [247, 202]
(and a paper by other authors [164]) frame software piracy
in terms of a number of criminological theories (such as
Differential Association Theory, and Neutralization The-
ory) that focus mostly on the offender, thus falling beyond
the scope of the present paper. The seventh paper [245]
argues that situational crime prevention is more effective
when the target and the offender share a common situ-
ation. For example if the offender and target are both
employees of one organisation then a variety of instru-
ments are available to the management of that organisa-
tion. Willison provides an example of a crime script for
a typical insider fraud case such as that committed by
Leeson. The last paper by Willison (and Siponen) [248] is
a synthesis of earlier work published in the flagship jour-
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nal of the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM).
This we hope will lead to a better uptake of the ideas from
Crime Science in the Computer Science community.
We believe that the notion of an “insider” is becoming
less and less useful for the simple reason that the bound-
aries that used to separate insiders from outsiders are
gradually disappearing. We give three examples. First,
organisations outsource a growing part of their business
(for example sales and HRM). Second, organisations form
strategic alliances with other organisations, such that em-
ployees from one organisation must have access to infor-
mation from another. Third, cloud computing relieves an
organisation of the need to look after its IT assets; in-
stead the employees of the Cloud Service Provider (CSP)
take charge. In the end the information that used to be
accessible to the employees of one organisation are now ac-
cessible to a large number of other organisations as well,
thus turning more and more people into various degrees
of “insider”.
However, can we jettison the concept of the insider just
like that? Again Crime Science comes to the rescue, in
the person of Marcus Felson who proposed the concept of
“specialised access” [96] to characterise the specific oppor-
tunity structure of white collar crime. Specialized access
captures the difference between the opportunity that an
employee of an organisation, or its strategic partners, or
its oursourcees, or its CSP have as compared to any one
else. A network of organisations is usually governed by a
set of Service Level Agreement (SLA), which can be used
as the legal basis needed to operationalise specialised ac-
cess. What is missing is a technical notion of specialized
access, which leads to the following suggestion for future
research:
Question 1 What is the merit of framing the insider
problem as a problem of specialised access?
A suitable target is something that might appeal to an
offender [95]. Bread is rarely stolen in affluent countries,
but cash is the “mother’s milk” of crime in any coun-
try. Crime Scientists often describe suitable targets using
checklists. For example Concealable, Removable, Avail-
able, Valuable, Enjoyable, and Disposable (CRAVED) is a
simple to use checklist to determine which products might
become hot [63]. The mobile phone is a perfect example
of a CRAVED product [74], and so is the laptop [151].
Information (e.g. credit card data) can also be described
in terms of CRAVED [184, Chapter 4].
Some targets, like marked car parts are unattractive
to thieves because of the difficulty of fencing such parts.
However, property marking schemes incur a certain cost,
which depending on the popularity of the target may
be hard to justify. Interestingly, information technology
makes it possible to “mark” property even after it has
been lost or stolen, thus avoiding the up front cost for
property marking. For example a mobile phone can be
disabled via the network, once it has been stolen [240].
Similarly, a laptop or mobile phone can be fitted with re-
mote wipe technology [207], which allows the owner to
erase the data on the device via the Internet. To an of-
fender who is interested in the data, for example in the
case of industrial espionage, remote wipe technology thus
has the capability of reducing the suitability of the target.
We have been unable to find studies that investigate the
effect of remote wipe technology on the likelihood of theft
of equipment fitted with that technology, thus leading to
the following suggestion for future research:
Question 2 What manipulations of e.g. value of stolen
digital goods would be effective in deterring potential at-
tackers of these assets?
Routine Activity does not distinguish between different
types of target. We have given some examples of property
targets but targets can be personal too [71]. For example
the victim of cyber bullying is a personal target. Often
the person standing between the offender and a property
target becomes a personal target. Stajano and Wilson
give a detailed account of many classical scams showing
how even the most vigilant people can become personal
targets [205].
A capable guardian can be an effective deterrent for
an offender, for example a security guard patrolling an
underground station. The classical example of what hap-
pened when capable guardians were absent is the mete-
oric rise in day time residential burglaries in the US in
the 1960s. This can be explained by considering that in
the 1960s more and more women joined the labour force,
leaving homes empty where previously they were occupied
during daytime [71].
Deciding who could play the role of guardian in various
forms of cyber-crime is not an easy question. For exam-
ple, in the case of cyber-bullying, parents could monitor
Internet usage of their children, but this is more easily
said than done [175]. Chua et al [60] suggest that the
vigilantes in on-line auction communities such as eBay,
who try to sabotage auctions of suspicious sellers, could
be considered capable guardians. However, auction sites
generally do not condone the activities of the vigilantes,
because it is undesirable that people take the law in their
own hands [140].
Whether the Routine Activity Approach works as well
for cyber-crime as for traditional crime is an open ques-
tion. On the one hand, Yar [254] suggests that in general
the ideas apply, but that the differences between the In-
ternet and the real world are large, in particular there
does not seem to be a useful notion of place on the Inter-
net. We consider four possible alternatives for a notion of
place, but this is by no means an exhaustive list:
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Firstly, low level candidates such as the Media Access
Control (MAC) address or the Internet Protocol (IP)
address of a computer are probably not useful as location
since both can be changed easily, for example using the
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP).
Secondly, geographically based notions of place, such as
the address of the ISP, the mobile base station of a mo-
bile phone, or the wireless access point that an increas-
ing number of Internet users go through might be useful.
However it is normally not possible to retrieve such in-
formation without the cooperation of the relevant service
provider. Such cooperation usually requires a court or-
der, because the service provider naturally would try to
protect the interests of its customers.
Thirdly, the Internet is a network that exhibits a certain
structure that can in principle be exploited. For example
the computers on the Internet as well as the World Wide
Web form cliques, just like social networks [5]. In a social
network a clique is a circle of friends or acquaintances
from which offenders often choose their targets. Whether
or not cliques play a similar role in cyber-crime is as yet
unexplored.
Finally, Newman and Clarke [184] suggest focusing on
a semantic notion of place, a nice example of which is
provided by Holt and Bossler [138]. They report on an
empirical test designed to explore the applicability of the
Routine Activity Approach to a specific form of cyber-
crime: On-line harassment. A survey amongst 788 col-
lege students found that spending a lot of time on the
Internet does not necessarily increases the risk of victim-
ization, unless significant time is spent in virtual meeting
places such as chat rooms, where suitable targets are in
contact with potential offenders. This suggests that vir-
tual meeting places represent a suitable notion of place in
the context of a particular form of on-line harassment.
Summarising, according to the Routine Activity Ap-
proach, cyber-crime needs a potential offender, a suitable
target, and the absence of a capable guardian. This sug-
gests future research as follows:
Question 3 How to measure proximity in the cyber-
physical world?
3.1.2 Crime Pattern Theory
Crime Pattern Theory [35] assumes that offenders find
opportunities for crime during the daily journey between
home, work, and leisure. As a result, usually crime occurs
in specific patterns and usually crime is concentrated at
particular places, and at particular times, i.e. hot spots.
Knowledge of such hot spots can be used to protect those
who have been victimized, since if we can predict what
the hot spots are, where they are, and who is likely to
be victimized, we can target the efforts of crime preven-
tion more precisely and effectively [34]. For example town
planners can use maps showing the incidence of crime to
change street plans [36], and police resources can be de-
ployed more effectively [32].
Traditional crime is generally serial crime because phys-
ical constraints make it difficult to commit more than one
crime at once [43]. This means that normally a time and
a geographical location can be associated with traditional
crime, and that there is a one to one relationship between
offender and target. Sometimes, the time or location of
a crime is not accurately known. For example a bur-
glary is usually discovered some time after it has taken
place [4], but the location is accurately defined. With
obscene phone calls, time is not normally the problem
but location: the caller could make his calls from any-
where [61].
By contrast, the notion of time (and location as ex-
plained above) in cyber-space is not well understood, and
as a result there is no general notion of a cyber-crime hot
spot. The only exception that we have found is formed
by the chartrooms that are frequented by cyber stalk-
ers. This unfortunate situation is caused by the fact that
computers and networks can automate aspects of human
activity, including crime.
Leveraging the Internet, it is easy to commit many
crimes at once at many places all over the world. For
example an offender can instruct thousands of computers
in a collection of computers programmed to attack on
a massive scale (BotNet) to attack web sites all over the
world at the same time. One might argue that the In-
ternet consists of many interconnected computers, where
hot spots in the sense of busy computers naturally arise,
simply because some computers have more connections
than others. However, we have not found any research
investigating the activity of cyber-criminals on Internet
hotspots.
If the offender can leverage the power of the Internet,
then crime prevention should be able to do so too. We
give two examples.
Firstly, there are various services trawling the Internet
for credentials such as credit cards (for example http:
//www.cardcops.com/ [101]), so that anyone concerned
that his credit card may be stolen can consult a web site
to check.
Secondly, all activity on the Internet leaves traces that
can in principle be mined, like regular audit trails [228]. It
is probably harder to collect traces in the real world than
on the Internet, thus for once creating an advantage for
cyber-crime prevention over traditional crime prevention.
However, collecting large amounts of information that
could eventually be used to prevent or detect cyber-crime
would have serious privacy implications that will have to
be dealt with appropriately. For example, one promising
line of research allows the privacy of the persons to be
revoked under well defined circumstances [136]. By way
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of conclusion we offer two suggestions for future research:
Question 4 How can we monitor activity on the Internet
to identify hot spots and still respect privacy?
Question 5 What exactly is a “hot spot” on the Inter-
net?
3.1.3 Rational Choice Perspective
The Rational Choice Perspective of human action is used
in Economics [201], Psychology [225], and Sociology [72],
but the roots are in the work of utilitarian philosophers
such as Bentham and John Stuart Mill. It was adapted
to the explanation of crime by Cornish and Clarke [74].
The Rational Choice Perspective says that behaviour is
governed by its expected consequences. Translated to
crime, this means that potential offenders make a judg-
ment, weigh the costs and benefits, and commit a spe-
cific crime when the estimated benefits are greater than
the costs. The choices are often based on bounded ratio-
nality, because human actors have limited knowledge, are
limited in their ability to reason about all the possible con-
sequences of an action, and are subject to the constraints
of a given context (e.g. being drunk). Accordingly, a
Rational Choice Perspective of crime does not mean that
offenders act wisely or are pursuing choices that are ra-
tional or beneficial in the long term. It means that, often
quickly and under pressure, offenders attempt to decide,
using their bounded rationality, how to act to maximize
their profits, and to minimize their risks. They use the
“fast and frugal heuristics” [108]. For example, burglars
choose unoccupied houses, which have relatively easy ac-
cess (the first or the last in a row), and which allow the
offender to remain hidden [77]. Burglars are often more
preoccupied by minimizing risk rather than increasing the
rewards [77].
The Rational Choice Perspective has already pro-
vided guidance to researchers of Information Security re-
searchers. We have discussed the work of Willison in Sec-
tion 3.1.1, and we should also like to mention some case
studies. For example Aytes and Connolly [14] present a
survey of 167 college graduates showing that risky be-
haviour, such as sharing passwords, or opening suspect
emails is a rational choice. Higgins [134] presents a sur-
vey of 318 college students showing that low self control,
which is a factor that influences the rational choice people
make, is linked to software piracy.
The Rational Choice Perspective has been applied in
simulation in Social Science [92] and more specifically in
crime simulations [168] (see Section 6.1) as well as the
study of the Economics of Information Security (see Sec-
tion 6.2). While these are promising results, there is con-
siderable scope for more research into the Rational Choice
Perspective on cyber-crime.
Summarising, the Rational Choice Perspective hypoth-
esises that like traditional offenders, cyber-crime actors
operate under bounded rationality too. This suggests the
following topic for future research:
Question 6 Which cost/benefit tradeoffs do cyber-
criminals actually make?
3.1.4 Repeat Victimization
Many crimes target the same victim repeatedly, which
is referred to as Repeat Victimization [93]. For exam-
ple, in the 1992 British crime Survey, 63% of all property
crime was suffered by people who had already suffered
a property crime recently, and 77% of all personal crime
was suffered by people who had already suffered a recent
personal crime. Burglarized houses are often victimized
twice at relatively short intervals [32]. Repeat Victimiza-
tion is not a perspective in the same sense as the Rational
Choice Perspective, the Routine Activity Approach, and
Crime Pattern Theory, but it is an important result from
crime analysis. Repeat Victimization probably also ap-
plies to cyber-crime, but reports are inconclusive. For
example, thieves know that companies are likely to re-
place stolen laptops so they will come back to take the
replacements [151]. Templeton and Kirkman [215] give
many tragic accounts of how vulnerable the elderly are of
Repeat Victimization, where the Internet and email used
as a tool by the offenders. We believe that it should be
possible to use the Internet also as a tool to detect Repeat
Victimization and suggest:
Question 7 What is the extent and nature of repeat vic-
timization in cyber-crime?
3.2 Reducing the opportunity for crime
Based on the conceptual framework described above,
Crime Scientists have developed a number of principles
that – if applied correctly – should make prevention more
effective.
Two points need to be mentioned, before explaining
these principles. First, Crime Science studies up to now
have shown that one needs to be specific in terms of in-
cident context and goals of stakeholders to understand
precisely why specific crimes are committed and accord-
ingly, how they can be prevented. For example marking
car parts may discourage a thief trying to sell the parts,
but it will not be effective against joyriding, because this
is an incident with a different context and different ac-
tor goals. Second, the principles, and more specifically,
the different techniques should be considered as work in
progress [66]. As research progresses and our knowledge
of crime prevention increases, the principles and the tech-
niques may increase in number, for example to deal with
cyber-crime more effectively.
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3.2.1 The 5 principles of opportunity reduction
The five principles try to prevent the crime or to deter
the offender. The first three principles are economic in
nature, the last two are psychological:
i Increase the effort of crime, for example better locks
require more effort to pick, or better passwords require
more effort to guess;
ii Increase the risks of crime, for example well lit win-
dows increase the risk of being caught during burglary,
or an operator monitoring the network increases the
risk of being caught during a hacking attempt;
iii Reduce the rewards of crime, for example marked
parts of a stolen vehicle are harder to fence, or en-
crypted data is harder to sell;
iv Reduce provocations that invite criminal behaviour,
for example rapid cleaning of graffiti discourages the
application of more graffiti, or rapid restoration of de-
faced web sites discourages repetition;
v Remove excuses for criminal behaviour, for example a
sign asking people to pay for a service is more effective
when a pair of eyes is printed on the sign, as opposed
to a bunch of flowers [16], or educating Internet users
the difference between content that is free and content
that is not free.
For each of the five principles, five generic opportunity-
reducing techniques have been developed. Together, they
are known as the “25 opportunity reducing techniques”.
Table 2 taken from Cornish and Clarke [73] has one col-
umn for each of the five principles (numbered i . . . v), and
shows five generic techniques in each column (numbered
1 . . . 5 in the first column, 6 . . . 10 in the second column
etc), with an example from a specific technique that has
been proved to be effective against traditional crime [124].
There is no relation between the items in a row in the ta-
ble; hence the rows have not been numbered. In principle
the items within each column could be presented in a dif-
ferent order.
The 25 generic opportunity reducing techniques cannot
be applied directly. A specific instance of the 25 generic
techniques must be found that is appropriate in the con-
text of a specific crime, given the goals of specific actors.
Consider as an example the generic technique of “target
hardening” for principle i. If the target is a car and the
crime is joy riding, then a specific technique would be “im-
plement steering column locks” (See cell 1). Case studies
have proven steering column locks to be successful [170].
Other techniques could also be effective, for example the
general technique of “conceal targets” (See cell 11) for
principle iii can be achieved by implementing the specific
technique of “off-street parking”. If the right technique is
applied, the results can be significant, as demonstrated by
many case studies [62]. In these case studies cyber-crimes
are not represented yet. However, in the next section we
will show that based on our literature review, many of the
25 generic techniques are in principle as applicable to the
prevention of cyber-crime as they are to traditional crime.
3.2.2 The 25 opportunity reducing techniques
We have found seven recent reviews in the literature that
suggest how Information Security tools can be used as a
specific instance of the 25 generic techniques [19, 46, 180,
184, 248, 191, 239].
We will discuss each of seven reviews briefly, followed by
a comparison of the salient recommendations offered by
the first six reviews. The last review focuses on a specific
technology, a Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tag,
which makes it less suitable for the comparison.
The first review by Beebe and Rao [19] associates 44
commonly used Information Security techniques with the
25 generic techniques (actually a predecessor to the 25
generic techniques which consisted of only 16 techniques).
It is unclear why these particular 44 techniques have been
selected, and the association is not motivated. This raises
the question whether other associations could also be jus-
tified. Beebe and Rao then count how many Information
Security techniques are associated with each of the five
principles and observe that more than half associate with
principle i. Beebe and Rao then conclude that it would
be useful to search for more Information Security tech-
niques that can be associated with the other principles, as
these seem under-populated. While we agree that search-
ing for more Information Security techniques to prevent
crime is worthwhile, we are not sure that principles ii-v
are indeed under-populated, as other mappings would be
equally plausible. We will give examples of techniques for
principles ii-v below.
The next four reviews [46, 180, 184, 248] associate spe-
cific Information Security techniques with the 25 generic
techniques, but do so in a more or less crime specific set-
ting, thus making association well motivated. Brookson
et al [46] present their association in the context of fixed
and mobile phone fraud, Broadcast and Pay TV fraud,
Hacking on the Internet, and misuse of WLAN and Blue-
tooth networks. Newman and Clarke [184] choose the
setting of electronic commerce, and Willison and Sipo-
nen [248] present an association in the setting of embez-
zlement. Morris [179, 180] reports how a panel of about
50 experts proposes to deal with money laundering, fraud,
extortion, espionage, malicious software, malicious misin-
formation, and unlawful markets and communities.
The sixth review by Reyns [191] is crime specific, as it
focuses on Cyber stalking. The review analyses 10 surveys
of stalking, showing that in about 25% of the cases, the
Internet in one form or another plays a role. Using the
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Economical cost and balance Psychological cost and balance
i. Increase effort ii. Increase Risks iii. Reduce Rewards iv. Reduce Provoca-
tion
v. Remove Excuses
1.Harden target 6.Extend
guardianship
11.Conceal Tar-
gets
16.Reduce frus-
trations
21.Set rules
- Steering column
locks and immobilis-
ers
- Take routine pre-
cautions: go out in
group at night, leave
signs of occupancy,
carry phone
- Off-street parking - Efficient queues
and polite service
- Rental agreements
2.Control access 7.Natural surveil-
lance
12.Remove Tar-
gets
17.Avoid disputes 22.Post instruc-
tions
- Entry phones - Improved street
lighting
- Removable car ra-
dio
- Separate enclosures
for rival soccer fans
- “No Parking”
3.Screen exits 8.Reduce
anonymity
13.Identify prop-
erty
18.Reduce arousal 23.Alert con-
science
- Ticket needed for
exit
- Taxi driver IDs - Property marking - Controls on violent
pornography
- Roadside speed dis-
play boards
4.Deflect offend-
ers
9.Place Managers 14.Disrupt mar-
kets
19.Neutralize
peer pressure
24.Assist compli-
ance
- Street closures - CCTV for double-
deck buses
- Monitor pawn
shops
- “Idiots drink and
drive”
- Easy library check-
out
5.Control facilita-
tors
10.Formal surveil-
lance
15.Deny benefits 20.Discourage im-
itation
25.Control disin-
hibitors
- “Smart” guns - Red light cameras - Ink merchandise
tags
- Rapid repair of van-
dalism
- Breathalyzers in
pubs
Table 2: The 25 Generic opportunity reducing techniques used to prevent traditional crime, with an example of a
crime specific technique for each of the 25. (From Cornish and Clarke [73])
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16 → 25 16 → 25 16 → 25 16 → 25
1 1 5 3 9 12 13 21
2 2 6 10 10 13 14 23
3 5 7 9 11 11 15 14
4 4 8 7 12 15 16 24
Table 3: Mapping of the old 16 to the current 25 generic
techniques.
structure of the 25 techniques, Reyns suggests a number
of ways to make cyber stalking more difficult, but he has
not actually implemented any of his suggestions.
The two oldest reviews [180, 184] use the older 16
generic techniques. We have mapped these onto the cur-
rent 25 generic techniques as indicated in Table 3.
The last review [239] describes the potential for crime
prevention with an RFID tag, ranging from inexpensive
chip-less tags [15] to high-end tags. The review shows that
a specific technique (in this case the RFID) fits in all of
the 25 generic techniques. To illustrate the point, the re-
view contains a short case study of Tesco’s supermarket in
Cambridge where RFID tags are used to protect packets
of razor blades. If a packet is taken from the shelf, a secu-
rity camera starts recording the customer. The customer
is again recorded when paying at the checkout. When
there is no recording of a paying customer, the recording
of the customer taking the blades is handed over to the
police.
The gross list of the specific techniques from the five
review papers can be found at http://eprints.eemcs.
utwente.nl/18500/ Here we provide a summary (see Ta-
ble 4) comparing the way in which the first six reviews
suggest how prominent Information Security techniques
can be used to prevent crime. We define prominent In-
formation Security techniques as those which have been
mentioned at least three times in the reviews. These are:
1. A password or pin code when kept secret can be used
to authenticate a user;
2. Encryption of data ensures that once encrypted, the
data can be read only when the correct decryption
key is known;
3. A Firewall is a tool that stops potentially malicious
connections to a computer or network;
4. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) stops poten-
tially malicious information being sent to a computer
or network;
5. A Virus scanner detects malicious code in the infor-
mation being sent to a computer or network;
6. An RFID tag is a tiny embedded computer that can
provide information about the product to which it is
attached;
7. Caller-ID is a technique that tells the recipient of a
telephone call who is calling;
8. An Audit log collects relevant operational data that
can be analysed when there is an incident;
9. An ISP is an organisation that provides Internet con-
nectivity to its clients.
10. User education can be a powerful tool. Including
this in the list shows that we interpret Information
Security in a broad sense.
We will now discuss the 10 techniques in more detail.
Passwords and pin codes are mentioned in all re-
views, as these are the basic tools of Information Secu-
rity. Unfortunately, a good password or pin code is hard
to remember so that as a result many passwords and pin
codes that are currently in use are weak [8].
Firewalls are mentioned in three of the four reviews [19,
46, 180] as a specific technique for target hardening, (prin-
ciple i). This is also the only technique that all authors
associate with the same generic technique. We take this
as an indication that there is no ambiguity surrounding
the application of firewalls as a means of situational crime
prevention.
Encryption is seen by two reviews [46, 180] as a means
to harden targets (principle i) and by the others [19, 248]
as a means to deny benefits (principle iii). The appar-
ent ambiguity can be resolved if we take a crime specific
example, such as stealing a laptop with full disk encryp-
tion. Disk encryption increases the efforts on the part of
the offender because he will now have to break the disk
encryption. If the offender is unable to break the disk en-
cryption, the laptop will be worth less; hence encryption
will also reduce rewards.
Spatial fragmentation is a target hardening technique
that can be used to prevent products from being lost or
stolen. For example an in-car entertainment system that
consists of many components built into various places into
a car is harder to steal than a single component [90]. Spa-
tial fragmentation is more easily applied to a networked
system, for example peer to peer systems usually apply
spatial fragmentation for load balancing purposes, but the
spatial fragmentation could be leveraged to prevent illegal
downloading too. In a sense threshold cryptography is an
instance of spatial fragmentation too. (In (n, t) thresh-
old cryptography the decryption key is split into n shares
in such a way that decryption can only take place when
the number of shares present during decryption equals or
exceeds a previously determined threshold t.)
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Economical cost and balance Psychological cost and balance
Increase effort Increase Risks Reduce Rewards Reduce Provocation Remove Excuses
1.Harden target
- Firewalls
[19, 46, 180, 184]
- Vulnerability
patches [19, 180]
- Encryption [46]
- ISP as a first line
of defence [180]
- IDS [180]
6.Extend
guardianship
- RFID [46]
11.Conceal Tar-
gets
16.Reduce frus-
trations
21.Set rules
- Educate end-users
[180]
- Provide a clear
code of conduct
[191]
2.Control access
- Authentication
using passwords,
pins [19, 46, 184]
- Caller ID like
technology for
Internet [180]
7.Natural surveil-
lance
- Report suspect
email and
information request
to ISP [184]
12.Remove Tar-
gets
17.Avoid disputes 22.Post instruc-
tions
3.Screen exits
- IDS [19]
- Audit trail [46]
- Audit trail
[180, 184]
8.Reduce
anonymity
- RFID [46]
- Caller ID [46]
13.Identify prop-
erty
- RFID [46, 184]
18.Reduce arousal 23.Alert con-
science
- Public awareness
on the consequences
of crime [180]
- educate: ‘copying
software is stealing’
[184]
4.Deflect offend-
ers
9.Place Managers
- IDS [46]
14.Disrupt mar-
kets
- ISP should be keen
to assist
investigations [180]
19.Neutralize
peer pressure
24.Assist compli-
ance
- Security education
of staff [248]
5.Control facilita-
tors
- Caller ID [46]
- Make the ISP
accountable for the
traffic [180]
10.Formal surveil-
lance
- Auditing and trail
reviews [19]
- RFID [46]
- Early warning
systems of viruses
and hacking attacks
[180]
- IDS [248]
15.Deny benefits
- Encrypt valuable
data [19, 248, 184]
20.Discourage im-
itation
25.Control disin-
hibitors
- Cyber-ethics
education [19]
- Campaign against
hacker culture [184]
Table 4: The 25 Generic techiques used to structure popular Information Security techniques.
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An IDS is mentioned in three of the four reviews [180,
46, 248], but in different ways. The most common is
“Formal surveillance” [248], principle ii. However “Utilize
place managers” [46], also principle ii is also used, with the
addition that the IDS should have “inference capabilities”.
The difference between the two generic techniques is best
explained in the physical world: formal surveillance is car-
ried out by specially appointed personnel, whereas place
managers are typically colleagues watching each other.
RFID tags are mentioned only by Brookson et al [46] in
four different capacities: “Extend guardianship” to reflect
the idea that the tag can be used to raise the alarm in
the case of shoplifting, “Reduce anonymity” since tagged
goods can be used to trace the person carrying the goods,
and “Formal surveillance”, since tagged goods make it
easier to recognise shoplifters, all principle ii. RFID tags
are most naturally thought of as a technique to “Identify
property”, principle iii. A separate study [239] shows that
RFID tags can be used for all of the 25 generic techniques.
Caller-ID is mentioned in two reviews [46, 180] as an
effective technique to Control access, Reduce anonymity,
and to Control facilitators. In the real world, Caller-ID
has reduced the number of nuisance calls in the telephone
network [61]. This is an indication of the fact that further
work is needed to try and find a similar, effective technique
for the Internet. There is some promising work on this
topic in the Internet but it requires hardware support and
changes to the way that an ISP operates [241].
An Audit trail is mentioned by several reviews as a
powerful tool to investigate the sequence of events leading
up to an incident. An Audit trail does not prevent crime
per se, but the fact that all actions are logged can be used
as a deterrent [184].
The ISP should be more active in the prevention of
crime, this conclusion is shared by all the seven reviews.
We have also found many suggestions in the related work
to empower the ISP. For example Kennedy [149] claims
that only 5% of all downloads are paid for, which causes
a serious problem for the music industry. Kennedy de-
scribes two approaches where the ISP can play a key role.
The first approach consists of introducing new business
models such as Nokia’s “Comes with Music”, which gives
the customer who buys a handset a years worth of free mu-
sic. The catch is that included in the price of the handset
is a fee for the music. The customer can keep the music,
also after the contract has expired. This can be seen as an
attempt by the ISP to reduce the rewards (principle iii)
for illegal downloading. The second approach is to stress
the fact that a large fraction of the bandwidth of an ISP
is used for illegal downloads, thus reducing the bandwidth
for legal use of the network. A typical ISP would block or
throttle bit torrent traffic, which is responsible for most
of the illegal downloads. This would be an instance of the
specific technique “Control facilitators” (Principle i). Re-
ducing the potential for illegal downloads automatically
increases the available bandwidth for legal use. Whether
this is an appropriate solution is open to debate, as bit
torrent also has legal uses. There is also a fundamental
issue here in the sense that an ISP blockade goes against
the principle of net neutrality [230]. ISP blocking can
even help the offender rather than preventing crime: Clay-
ton [70] describes how a major ISP implemented a system
for blocking content (child pornography), which readily
leaked the list of blocked sites. The blocking system could
then be used by the offenders as an “oracle” to discover
which sites were on the black list, so that they could take
evasive action. The main conclusion of Clayton’s paper
is that a “fit and forget” approach to designing Internet
base crime prevention is doomed to failure; instead the
potential targets will be engaged in a perpetual arms race
with the offenders.
Returning to the five reviews, the Morris reports [179,
180] contain the creative suggestions for empowering the
ISP. The panels would like to see the ISP as a first line of
defence (i.e. target hardening, principle i) so as to assist
the consumer in her arduous task of keeping her computer
clean and healthy. The services provided by the ISP can
also be seen as a tool for the offender to reach his tar-
gets. In this sense, making the ISP more accountable for
what goes on in its network can be seen as an instance of
the “Control facilitators” generic technique (again princi-
ple i). Finally, the ISP could advertise that it is proac-
tive in preventing crime, and that the ISP will cooperate
closely with the police wherever she can. This falls into
the generic technique of “Alert conscience”, principle iv.
We believe that it would be a interesting to investigate:
Question 8 What roles can ISPs have in preventing
cyber-crime, and what is the effectiveness of these roles?
Education of offenders, targets, and guardians is con-
sidered useful by all reviews to remove excuses (principle
iv). Brookson et al [46] believe that if we “Alert con-
science” potential offenders might be discouraged from
engaging in software and content piracy. In the context
of his work on insiders, Willison [248] suggests that the
education of staff might “Assist compliance” with com-
pany policies. The panel of Morris [180] asserts that cus-
tomer security education for e-banking, for example us-
ing the five “golden rules” of e-banking is a specific case
of “Set rules”. Finally using education to “Control dis-
inhibitors” merits a little digression. Before the Inter-
net went commercial in early nineties many users adhered
to the “hacker’s ethic” which promoted that information
should be free [102]. When the Internet opened for busi-
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ness, new information was made available that is clearly
not free. However the hackers’ ethic is still with us today,
which is a disinhibitor for good behaviour [184]. Appro-
priate education would be appropriate to explain the dif-
ference between information that is free and information
that is not.
Table 4 offers no suggestions to “Reduce provocation”
(principle iv) and only two suggestions to “Reduce re-
wards” (principle iii). This does not mean to say that
there are no Information Security techniques that can be
applied in these categories; it might mean that the five
cited reviews have not thought of such means, or that
researchers in the Computer Science community do not
think of their work as a means to prevent crime.
There are Computer Science techniques that fit per-
fectly in the scheme of the 25 generic techniques, but
which have not been mentioned by the seven review pa-
pers. These are:
Control facilitators is not considered by any of the
reviews but we believe this to be applicable. For example
modern colour copiers refuse to copy a bank note [148].
Deny benefits is not considered by any of the reviews
but we have found suggestions in the Crime Science lit-
erature that this could work [90]. For example the buyer
of a new car can choose from a range of options how to
personalise the car, not only by the engine and body iden-
tification systems but also by colour schemes, choice of
upholstery, accessories etc. It is not unreasonable to ex-
pect product personalisation to be applicable to less ex-
pensive produces as well, such as the mobile phone, the
computer, music, film or software. Once personalised and
sold, it would be possible to trace the movements of a per-
sonalised product when it is lost or stolen, thus denying
benefits to the offender.
Control disinhibitors plays a significant role in tradi-
tional crime, which is often fuelled by drugs and alcohol.
However, little is known about Internet addiction. The
first reference to Internet addiction that we have been
able to trace is Young [256], who argues that Internet
addiction is a behavioural disorder like pathological gam-
bling. Internet addition can be serious; in the press there
are reports of fatalities, and reports of deviant behaviour
promulgated by Internet addiction [121] have appeared in
the literature.
Summarising, it appears that many of the techniques
from Information Security help to prevent cyber-crime.
This leads to the following suggestion for future research:
Question 9 Which of the 25 opportunity-reducing tech-
niques is most effective in preventing which class of cyber-
crime?
3.3 A body of evaluated practice
A large number of studies report on the effectiveness of
Crime Science for traditional crime; Guerette and Bow-
ers [124] provide an excellent starting point. However, for
Cyber-crime Science only few relevant studies exist. We
substantiate this claim in Section 4.
3.4 Displacement of crime and diffusion
of benefits
One of the most difficult aspects of reducing the opportu-
nity for crime is to make sure that there is a real reduc-
tion and not simply displacement. In some case studies,
displacement of crime can be ruled out. The classic exam-
ple is the detoxification of gas used in British households.
Coal based gas, which contains a significant fraction of
highly toxic Carbon Monoxide (CO), was the method of
choice to commit suicide (Suicide is not a crime in the le-
gal sense). When natural gas replaced coal based gas the
total number of suicides (i.e. regardless of the method
by which the suicide was committed) dropped dramati-
cally [67]. An example that does apply to crime is the
alley-gating scheme that was implemented in Liverpool
(UK) to prevent burglary [33]. The scheme involved the
installation of lockable gates across these alleys preventing
access to the alley for those without a key. An evaluation
showed that there was a significant reduction of burglar-
ies within the alley-gated areas. Also, the initiative had
not caused geographical displacement of burglary. On the
contrary: there was evidence of a “diffusion of benefit”,
whereby, burglary not only reduced within the gated ar-
eas but also fell by 10% in several 200m buffer zones sur-
rounding the gated areas [34]. Another example is the
installation of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in cer-
tain London Underground stations but not in all, the level
of crime, in contrast, dropped in all stations [69]. It is as-
sumed that when offenders notice crime prevention they
become more alerted to the risk of crime generally, and
not just in situations were crime preventions measures
were taken [65].
A review of the literature found 102 studies that con-
tained 574 observations reporting displacement of crime
in 26% of the observations, and diffusion of benefits in
27% of the observations [124]. Overall, the effect of diffu-
sion of benefits was larger than the effect of displacement
of crime and the total results were larger than the results
in the experimental area only [124].
We have not found any studies of displacement of crime
or diffusion of benefits in Information Security. This leads
to the following suggestion for future research:
Question 10 Which techniques merely displace the ben-
efits for the criminal, and which ones actually diffuse
them?
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An interesting issue is whether displacement of crime and
diffusion of benefits functions the same way in cyber-space
as in the physical world.
4 On the lack of evaluated prac-
tice in the Computer Science lit-
erature
After a cursory inspection of the literature in search of
evaluated practice of Crime Science applied to cyber-
crime we found little. In the following we report on an
exhaustive literature search for studies of the effectiveness
of cyber-crime prevention.
To illustrate what we have been looking for we give an
example of how the effectiveness of crime prevention can
be studied.
A Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) is a study of
an intervention (here crime prevention) where the effect
of the intervention on an experimental group is compared
with a control group that is not subject to the interven-
tion. Farrington et al report on an RCT of measures
against shoplifting [94]. Nine shops in the UK were ran-
domly assigned to three experimental conditions that were
believed to prevent shoplifting: (1) electronic tagging, (2)
store redesign, and (3) a guard, or to (4) a control condi-
tion. Shoplifting was measured at pre-test, post-test, and
at follow up (6 weeks after post-test). Results showed
that electronic tagging led to a significant decrease in
shoplifting that was maintained at follow up (decreases
from 30.8% to 4.4% and 17.3% to 5.5% in the two shops).
Store redesign leads to a decrease at post-test that was
not maintained at follow-up. And having a guard had
no effect on shoplifting. In the control shops, shoplifting
increased slightly or remained unchanged.
We have conducted an exhaustive search for empirical
research of this kind, but to our surprise, little empirical
research could be found, and we take this as an indication
that Cyber-crime Science is almost terra incognita. To
substantiate this claim, we describe the scope of or search
in some detail, and we provide possible explanations for
the fact that hardly any such research seems to exist. We
conclude this section with a call for more empirical eval-
uation of techniques from information security.
Table 5 lists all the papers cited in this review cate-
gorised according to the discipline. An asterisk indicates
papers that cite the work of the Crime Science pioneers.
The numbers in the second column do not add up due to
the presence of the category Recommended.
4.1 Searches
Firstly, we searched all 16 online proceedings in the pe-
riod 1995 – 2010 of the premier conference in Information
Security, i.e. the “Symposium on Security and Privacy”
of the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) for evaluated practice. Out of almost 650 on-
line papers, only 14 ([13, 51, 59, 113, 139, 145, 146, 196,
206, 208, 235, 236, 255, 257]) mention the word “crime”,
mostly in the abstract, motivation section or in the ref-
erences. We found not a single paper that aims to show
that Information Security actually prevents crime. Maybe
this is because such papers are out of scope of the con-
ference? We believe that this is not the case. Quoting
from http://www.ieee-security.org/ about the Sym-
posium:
“Papers offer novel research contributions in any
aspect of Computer Security or electronic pri-
vacy. Papers may represent advances in the the-
ory, design, implementation, analysis, or empir-
ical evaluation of secure systems, either for gen-
eral use or for specific application domains.”
Secondly, we looked in detail at all 77 papers of
the ACM Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS) from the years 2005 – 2009. The idea being that
usability research normally focuses on the user aspects of
technology, which we imagine would include crime as well.
The SOUPS papers can be classified as shown in the Ta-
ble 6. Only four (last two rows) out of the 77 papers are
relatives of Cyber-crime Science. None of the 77 papers
refer to the Crime Science literature. Most papers are us-
ability studies of Information Security, which focus on the
usefulness of the technology for its user. None of the pa-
pers discuss whether the proposed techniques are effective
in preventing cyber-crime. However, Section 5.1 discusses
anti-phishing research in detail, showing that the kind of
study that we have been looking for is feasible.
Thirdly, we have checked all 27 papers from the AWPG
eCrime Researchers summit held in 2006 – 2009. Seven
papers [100, 152, 157, 177, 178, 198, 204] were found to
be relevant from a Cyber-crime Science perspective, all of
which are discussed in Section 5.1.
Fourthly, we looked for all English language papers
in the Computer Science literature that cite the work
of one or more of the ten pioneers of Crime Science as
mentioned in the introduction. We found 84 such pa-
pers in the entire collection of digital libraries maintained
by the ACM on http:www.acm.org/dl/, the IEEE on
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/, and Elsevier on http:
//www.scopus.com/ subject area Computing (this in-
cludes the Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
series from Springer). We claim that we have thus cap-
tured all of the significant Computer Science literature
that can be considered related to Crime Science. Of those
84 papers we discuss the most relevant 24 in this paper.
The related work that we do not discuss are mostly appli-
cations of general Computer Science techniques (i.e. not
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Category N Papers
Biology 2 [16] [76]
Computing 139 [228] [3] [1] [2] [4]* [6] [7] [9] [8]* [11]* [13] [14] [15] [18] [17] [19]* [20] [21] [23] [24] [25] [29]*
[30]* [26]* [31]* [28]* [27]* [37]* [38]* [49] [48]* [50]* [45] [46]* [47]* [51] [53] [54] [55] [56]
[57] [58] [59] [60]* [70] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82]* [83] [85] [91] [100] [101] [102] [103] [105] [110]*
[112]* [111]* [113] [114] [115] [117] [120] [123] [126]* [125]* [128] [129] [133] [132] [136] [139]
[140]* [141] [144] [145] [146] [148] [149] [152] [153] [154] [155] [157] [156] [162]* [163]* [164]*
[165] [168]* [169] [171] [172]* [173]* [174] [176] [177] [178] [181] [190]* [193] [230] [196] [197]
[199] [198] [202]* [203] [205] [206] [207] [209] [208] [210] [212] [217]* [221]* [236] [235] [237]
[241] [243]* [245]* [246]* [244]* [247]* [248]* [250] [252]* [253]* [255] [257] [258] [259] [260]
[192]
Criminology 70 [10]* [22] [34]* [33]* [32]* [35]* [36]* [64]* [65]* [66]* [67]* [61]* [68]* [69]* [62]* [63]* [71]*
[72] [73]* [74]* [77] [88]* [87]* [86]* [90]* [92] [93]* [94]* [95]* [96]* [97]* [104]* [109]* [118]*
[119] [122]* [124]* [131] [134] [138]* [147]* [151]* [158] [159]* [160]* [161] [166]* [167]* [170]*
[179]* [180]* [184]* [182]* [183]* [188]* [191] [194] [211] [218] [219]* [223] [224] [231]* [233]*
[240]* [238] [239]* [249] [251]* [254]*
Economics 7 [52] [89] [130] [137]* [201] [214] [216]
Ethics 1 [99]
Law 23 [204] [12] [39] [43] [40] [41] [44] [42] [106] [107] [116] [135] [142] [143] [150] [229] [227] [213]
[220] [226] [232] [234] [242]
Medicine 8 [75]* [98] [127] [187] [189] [200] [215] [222]
Physics 1 [5]
Policy 1 [185]
Psychology 7 [84] [108] [121] [175]* [195] [225] [256]
Sociology 1 [186]*
Recommended 10 [2] [9] [22] [71]* [74]* [92] [156] [204] [248]* [43]
Total 260
Table 5: All papers cited in this review categorised according to the discipline. The star indicates papers that cite
the work of the Crime Science pioneers. The category Recommended represents highly recommended reading.
Number Purpose average number Crime Science
of papers of subjects in yes / no
case study
33 no case studies with users 0 no
26 classical usability studies of a new technology 29 no
14 usability studies of various new password technologies (e.g. graphical
passwords)
89 no
8 user surveys of various issues (mainly privacy) 155 no
3 teaching people how to avoid phishing scams [85, 199, 156] 183 partly
1 prevent shoulder surfing [212] 20 partly
Table 6: An analysis of the related work on phishing from the Crime Science point of view
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Information Security techniques) to problems in Criminol-
ogy, such as the Geographic Information System (GIS)
based analysis of crime data and agent based simulation
of crime data. However, we do present a high level review
of simulation and analysis of crime data in Section 6.1.
Fifthly, we searched the three data bases mentioned
above for RCT (including the British spelling with an
Randomised). We found over 1,000 publications, mostly
related to Medical Science. Not a single paper reports on
crime prevention.
4.2 Analysis
In spite of our efforts we have failed to find documented
scientific studies of how Information Security effectively
prevents cyber-crime. We offer three reasons why this
might be so.
Firstly, let us consider what happens if Information Se-
curity is broken. If this happens in the home or a small
business, the chances are that the breach will not be no-
ticed. The probability that the breach will be reported
to the police is remote. If a breach happens in an organ-
isation with professional Information Security staff, the
breach will probably be noticed. The breach may be re-
ported to the management but it will not necessarily be
reported to the police. There are three good reasons for
this: (1) not all breaches of Information Security consti-
tute a crime, (2) businesses typically prefer to deal with
the matter internally, although recent legislation is chang-
ing that to some extent, c.f. the US legislation on data
breaches [129], and (3) it is often not clear enough what
the intention of the offender is to report the offence to
the police. For example telephone companies typically
shut down the connection used by a fraudulent customer,
rather than to report the alleged fraud to the police [18].
The resulting reluctance to report an incident has the
consequence that relatively little information on breaches
of Information Security is available to researchers, and if
there is information, then privacy issues are a serious im-
pediment to the freedom of the researchers. However,
Crime Scientists have encountered similar problems in
their study of traditional crime too, with the same privacy
issues, and where crime is not always reported either. We
propose to use the tools from Crime Science to deal with
reluctance to report. The basic idea is that there are a
variety of sources (hospitals, housing associations, insur-
ance companies who all record data). The multiplicity of
data sources is in some sense even better than just one as
sources provide complementary information and have dif-
ferent biases, problems but also different strengths. More
importantly one of the important research tools of Crime
Science is holding surveys and interviews to collect data
that the police (or other relevant sources) do not have.
Secondly, crime prevention falls in the domain of Crim-
inology, whereas Computer Scientists are generally not
taught Criminology. For example the joint ACM IEEE
curriculum [185] mentions crime but only in an elec-
tive on computer crime, which focuses on the techni-
cal aspects of computer crime. We have not been able
to find an Information Security master program that
provides a solid grounding in Criminology. For exam-
ple course IY5605 computer crime at Royal Holloway
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/node/194/ uses Denning’s
excellent text book [80] as the main text. Her book of-
fers an encyclopaedic coverage of Information Security,
with many examples drawn from the authors own experi-
ence as an expert witness. The foundation of the book is
presented in chapter 2, which describes the “theory of in-
formation warfare”. This theory is purely based on ideas
from Information Security and is not linked to Criminol-
ogy.
Thirdly, those Information Security researchers who do
try to bridge the gap can fall foul of the legal issues in-
volved. For example Soghian [204] provides a number
of examples where Information Security researchers who
tried to do empirical research into the relative merits of
measures against phishing had problems with the law, see
Section 5.1.5 for details.
In conclusion, we found some work in the literature that
suggests how Crime Science methods can be used to pre-
vent cyber-crime, especially on insider threats (See Sec-
tion 3.1.1) and phishing (See Section 5.1), but no reports
have been found that actually demonstrate a reduction in
cyber-crime [231]. We believe that Information Security
researchers will be able to make progress in partnership
with other disciplines, as has already happened with Law
(See Section 6.3), Economics (See Section 6.2), and Psy-
chology [195]. We propose that a strong link is developed
with Crime Science, and we offer the present paper as a
starting point.
Since Crime Science offers a research methodology as
well as a number of results that can be applied we make
two suggestions for future research. The first suggestion
relates to the methodology of Crime Science, and the sec-
ond suggestion relates to the generic results of Crime Sci-
ence:
Question 11 How can we apply the empirical evaluation
methods of Crime Science to cyber-crime?
Studies of displacement of crime and the dissemination of
benefits are an essential aspect.
Question 12 Does Cyber-crime Science require an ex-
tension of the set of 25 generic techniques?
This includes developing a body of evaluated work that
tests how effective ideas from Information Security are in
preventing cyber-crime.
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5 Crime Science applied to cyber-
crime: Two Case studies
The purpose of this section is to show by example how
the methods of Crime Science could be used to structure
the search for effective cyber-crime prevention methods.
In particular the 25 generic techniques can be checked one
by one to find appropriate preventive measures. We chose
phishing because of its alarming rate of growth [174], its
high estimated cost [165], and the popularity of the sub-
ject amongst Information Security researchers and offend-
ers alike. The first case study focuses on the act of phish-
ing itself, whereas the second case study looks at a partic-
ular context for phishing i.e. that of online auction fraud.
5.1 Phishing
Before we explain what phishing is, we note that in In-
formation Security the term social engineering means ob-
taining confidential information by manipulating and/or
deceiving people [176]. Phishing is a form of social engi-
neering [141], whereby the offender tries to obtain sensi-
tive information of his targets by masquerading as some-
one the target trusts. Once the information is obtained,
the phisher uses the information for fraudulent purposes.
A typical successful phishing attempt may proceed as fol-
lows. The phisher buys email addresses in bulk, and then
sends a mass mailing to the inbox of many potential tar-
gets. The phisher pretends that the email is being sent
by the helpdesk of the target’s bank and asks her to log
in to her online banking website. The website is actually
a clone created by the phisher of the real banking web
site. Once the target has provided her credentials to the
cloned web site, the phisher uses the collected credentials
to log in to the real online bank and starts emptying the
target’s bank account. Phishing is not restricted to online
banking; other online services such as online auctions are
also heavily attacked.
Raising the level of awareness of potential targets has
proved to be somewhat effective against phishing [156].
This has inspired phishers to develop a more effective at-
tack in the form of spear phishing, which uses detailed
information about the target or her context to make the
scam more convincing. This information is typically col-
lected from blogs, social networks [141] and web search
engines.
5.1.1 Is phishing a real problem?
Dhamija et al [81] provide a detailed analysis of why users
fall for phishing, claiming that good phishing attacks can
fool as many as 90% of the targets. Dodge et al [83] re-
port that spear phishing has a success rate of up to 80%.
From a study of 20 non-expert computer users Downs et
al [85] claim that people fall victim to phishing attacks
because they lack the right mental model of the risks in-
volved in phishing attacks. Obtaining email addresses,
cloning web sites, deceiving users, and sending out large
numbers of emails can be automated. Phishers can work
anonymously from anywhere in the world, and are there-
fore hard to catch. This makes phishing a lucrative form of
cyber-crime. Gartner group estimates that in 2008 more
than 5 million US consumers lost on average 350$ due
to phishing scams, and that the number cases is rising,
while the average loss is falling [165]. Phishing is thus a
real problem.
5.1.2 Is phishing a new problem?
Given that situational crime prevention has thus far been
focused on the real world it makes sense to look for in-
formation on the prevention of real world scams that are
related to phishing. One truly vile scam that shares char-
acteristics with phishing is false billing of the bereaved.
In this case the offender sends a bill to someone who has
recently died. The name and address are obtained from
the obituaries in the news papers, and if the invoice ap-
pears credible, the bereaved family is likely to pay. False
billing and phishing are similar in the sense that the name
and address of the target are easily obtained. The actual
means by which the offender collects the money is dif-
ferent, but this should not matter if we can prevent the
target to fall for the scam. This, after all, is the objective
of crime prevention. Thus Phishing is not new, but the
degree of automation afforded by computers and the In-
ternet make it a bigger problem than related scams in the
real world because the latter cannot be automated. Un-
fortunately, we have not been able to find effective crime
prevention measures to deal with real world phishing.
5.1.3 How could the 25 generic techniques help
control phishing?
In this section we will try to use the 25 generic techniques
as guidance to look for measures that can prevent against
phishing. The idea is to explore the techniques systemat-
ically, trying to locate published work on the prevention
of phishing where the technique has been applied implic-
itly. A mismatch can then be taken as an opportunity to
develop new anti-phishing measures. We have been able
to find published work that addresses 8 of the 25 generic
techniques. We discuss each of these 8 below.
Harden target (1) Since phishing is a form of so-
cial engineering, target hardening then could be taken
as a form of training users to be more vigilant. Many
papers have been written on training programs against
phishing. The most prominent is perhaps the “School of
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phish” [156]. This is a well designed experiment compar-
ing to what extent three groups of about 170 participants
each fall for phishing scams. The control group received
no training, one group was trained once and the last group
received training twice. The results suggest that training
reduces the likelihood of participants falling for phishing
scams. However, even after training the number of par-
ticipants that fall for phishing scams remains large, of the
order of 20%. The “School of phish” team found that re-
gardless of the demographics all participants are equally
likely to fall for phishing. Given that the participants in
the experiments are all staff or student at a top university
(Carnegie Mellon), it would seem probable that partici-
pants selected at random from the population at large
would be even more inclined to fall for phishing scams.
The “School of phish” study can be taken as an indica-
tion that training alone is not going to solve the problem.
The “School of phish” is a well designed experiment in
the spirit of Crime Science. The next step would be to
investigate whether crime has been reduced or not as a
result of the training. This is actually a hard question to
answer unless researchers are permitted to commit fraud
themselves. The problem here is that for a realistic ex-
periment, one would like the subjects to experience real
crime, which, in the case of phishing means to take the
subject’s money.
Control access to facilities (2) The phisher makes
use of three essential facilities to be able to carry out
the attack: bulk email lists, mass mailing, and the user’s
inbox. We discuss some measures to control access to
these three facilities.
Bulk email is easily available on the Internet (for as lit-
tle as a few $ per million addresses); hence it is prob-
ably hard to stop phishers from accessing bulk email.
Mass mailings consume resources that can in princi-
ple be controlled, for example by using client puz-
zles [144]. In the context of throttling mass mailings,
the sender is required to solve a mathematical puz-
zle before the recipient is willing to accept the email.
This slows the sender down so that mass mailings be-
come impractical. We found one patent application
mentioning this possibility [193] but no related work
reporting on the effectiveness of such approaches.
An email inbox is easily accessible, but there are vari-
ous techniques designed to filter out unwanted email.
We list some of the more prominent ones below:
• Spam filters are able to stop a significant per-
centage of Spam but it is fundamentally impos-
sible to stop all Spam without also filtering out
some desirable mail [115].
• Making the sender pay for each email will dis-
courage offenders to send millions of spam mes-
sages, but it is not easy to enforce payment [154].
• Signed email is in principle easier to filter, as
the recipient can verify the signature. To rid
herself from Spam, a user could insist that all in-
coming email is digitally signed. Unfortunately,
there are serious problems with signed email
too. Firstly, phishers are likely to be the first
to adopt signed email [20]. Secondly only well
trained users can verify digital signatures [105].
Thirdly, requiring all emails to be signed curtails
the freedom of speech [20].
• Reputation based filtering could in principle be
use to filter email from sources with a low rep-
utation [78]. This has proved to be an effective
method to reduce fraud in online auctions [60],
but no related work has been found that applies
these ideas to the prevention of phishing.
While many attempts have been made, it appears to
be difficult to protect the user’s inbox. This leads to the
following suggestion for future research:
Question 13 Is there a way in which the user’s inbox can
be protected from unwanted email that does not destroy the
advantages of email?
Natural surveillance (7) Many online social networks
and related services such as online video and photo sites
provide a “report abuse” control [140]. This makes it
easier for users to report undesirable content or behaviour
than it is to report abuse in the real world. We believe
that similar controls could also help to reduce the phishing
problem. For example a “report phishing” button could
be installed on the email client, which ensures that the
alleged phishing email is brought to the attention of the
proper authorities (i.e. the ISP) before deleting it from
the inbox of the user.
Reduce anonymity (8) Phishers can easily flood the
user’s inbox, thus essentially mounting a kind of De-
nial of Service attack on the user. Denial of Service is
perhaps not such a big problem in the case of phishing
but it certainly is a big problem in the Internet in gen-
eral. Interestingly in real life “denial of service” occurs
too. For example it is possible to ruin the business of a
restaurant by making reservations and then not showing
up. Restaurants can protect their business by reducing
anonymity [62]. For example a reservation is not accepted
unless accompanied by a valid credit card number, which
will be charged if the customer does not show up. This
leads to the following suggestion for future research:
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Question 14 Would it be possible to prevent denial of
service attacks in the Internet by asking for a payment
guarantee?
Formal surveillance (10) As already indicated at
the beginning of this section, one of the main differ-
ences between cyber-crime and traditional crime is that
cyber-space provides better opportunities for surveillance.
While extensive monitoring could have implications for
the privacy of online users it is already a standard tool in
many areas of traditional crime fighting, such as analysing
credit card and telephone fraud [18]. Monitoring can also
be used to fight cyber-crime, for example by gathering of-
fender profiles [221], by analysing the social structure of
offender demography [58], or by analysing transactions in
Second Life [210]. This leads to the following suggestion
for future research:
Question 15 How could monitoring of Internet activity
reduce the threat of phishing?
Conceal targets (11) An email address is not a secret
so whatever a user does to keep an email address private,
sooner or later it will end up in the hands of the phishers.
Using a Disposable Email Address (DEA) would allow the
target to conceal her email address, and thus to conceal
the target of attack. Unfortunately, current DEA systems
are not able to hide completely that a user has multiple
email addresses [197], thus making it inconvenient to use
a DEA system.
Instead of trying to conceal the target’s email address
it is also possible to conceal the target’s credentials (i.e.
usernames, passwords and other identifying information)
once the target has disclosed them to the phisher. This
idea has been explored by Gajek et al [103] and sepa-
rately by Yue and Wang [258], who propose to pollute the
database of the phishers with false credentials. Since the
phisher does not know which credentials are false, he runs
the risk of being caught if he uses a false credential. Gajek
et al nor Yue and Wang have evaluated their proposals;
hence we do not know how effective polluting the phishers
data base is in reducing crime. This leads to the following
suggestion for future research:
Question 16 How effective is it to pollute the phishers
data base?
Post instructions (22) If Gajek et al [103] had framed
their work in terms of Crime Science; they might have
noticed that advertising the fact that active measures
against phishing are taken could be an effective preven-
tion.
Assist compliance (24) Adolescents who are active
on the Internet have a higher risk of becoming targets
of cyber-bullying and cyber-stalking [175]. Privacy En-
hancing Technologies try to help online users to reduce
the amount of private information divulged on the Inter-
net. Such technologies can help to prevent crimes, such
as bullying and stalking. Atkinson et al [11] propose a
browser plug-in that records where the user has disclosed
personal information. This raises the awareness of users
to the risks of disclosing information, and thus helps the
user to manage the risk, including the risk of phishing.
5.1.4 How to avoid phishing scams?
Finally we would like to summarise the advice on what
users can do right now to avoid phishing scams as given
by Downs et al [85]:
• Ignore any email asking to update personal info;
• Ignore any email threatening to close your bank ac-
count;
• Ignore any email from a bank that is not yours;
• Ignore any email with spelling and/or grammatical
errors;
• Ignore a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) with an
IP address such as http://12.34.56.68/Bank/;
• Check a URL using Google before clicking on it;
• Type the URL yourself, do not click on it.
Taking the advice above seriously will cost users time,
which, if it prevents a specific user from being victim-
ized may well be worth the effort at an individual level.
However, if we take into account the total effort of the
population at large to follow the advice, as compared to
the expected reduction in crime, the advice makes much
less sense at an aggregate level [132].
5.1.5 Anti-phishing research is hard
Anti-phishing research is not easy because of the legal and
ethical issues that are involved in such research. The legal
issues involved [204] include:
• Extracting significant amounts of information needed
for research from an online social network site violates
their terms of service;
• Copyright law prohibits the cloning of web sites;
• Confusing trademarks damages the good name of tar-
get;
• Phishing is illegal in California.
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The ethical problem at the heart of anti-phishing re-
search is the fact that realistic experiments often do not
treat participants in a study in accordance with the rules
of university ethical committees. For example, Jagatic et
al [141] report on a simple experiment whereby researchers
send spear-phishing emails to unsuspecting colleagues and
students. On the one hand the validity of the experiment
is probably diminished if the subjects are briefed about
an impending phishing attack. On the other hand a fully
briefed subject does not act as he/she normally would.
We see this as a challenge for a multidisciplinary research
team [99]:
Question 17 How to design phishing experiments that
are ethically acceptable, legally justified, and empirically
sound?
Summarising there are many approaches to curtail
phishing, but there are probably more opportunities for
new preventive measures. We have been able to classify
the most highly cited related work (32 out of 368 papers
from http://www.scopus.com/) on phishing using only 8
of the 25 generic techniques. We expect some of the other
17 techniques to be applicable to the phishing problem,
and we also expect that framing the technical measures in
terms of Crime Science is likely to bring important addi-
tional benefits in terms of measuring the effectiveness of
preventive measures.
This case study on the relationship between anti-
phishing research and Crime Science has hopefully con-
vinced the reader that the Crime Science perspective leads
to new ideas for effective crime prevention. Using the 25
generic techniques to structure the discussions has the two
important benefits: (1) The structuring provided by the
25 generic techniques classifies the literature. (2) The fact
that little or no literature has been found for some of the
techniques indicates that there might by further opportu-
nities for effective crime prevention. We suggest by way
of future research:
Question 18 To what extent do the 25 generic tech-
niques apply to the specific cyber-crime of phishing?
5.2 On-line Auction Fraud
As we have seen in the previous section, Crime Science
provides a number of techniques that can be used to com-
bat phishing. However, to be even more effective it pays
off to include also the context of phishing into the Crime
Science approach. Therefore we will present as a second
case study a typical online fraud scenario where phishing
is one of the many tools of the offender.
The underground economy consists of a large market
place of buyers and sellers of all manner of purloined infor-
mation, such as an attack that has just been discovered,
but for which no defence is available yet (zero-day attack),
a large email list, a collection of credit card data, a list
of credentials for an online auction or an online bank, the
name and address of someone who is prepared to receive
and reship goods in exchange for a fee (reshipper) etc.
The following crime scenario is a simplified but we be-
lieve realistic version of on-line auction fraud, where the
offender (Otto) impersonates one target (Tina) on an on-
line auction, while paying with the stolen credit card of
another target (Chris). Otto requires the services of his
dubious pawn broker Perry.
The idea of the scenario is to involve as many jurisdic-
tions as possible, which makes it so challenging for the
legal system to cope, that without sophisticated technol-
ogy this crime is almost impossible to prevent. There are
ten actors involved in the scenario, all from different coun-
tries with the exception of Otto and Perry, who live in the
same area.
Three actors are plainly dishonest:
• Otto is the offender.
• Perry is a pawnbroker who has been known to be
involved in fencing.
• Sam is the on-line supplier of false credentials, stolen
credit card information etc.
One actor, Vera, is honest in the sense that she does
not actually do anything illegal, but at the same time her
services would not be required by honest Internet users.
• Vera is the underground verification service which
Otto can ask whether actors like Sam can be trusted
to do business with. Otto needs service providers
like Vera because he does not want to be cheated by
a partner in crime.
The remaining six actors are honest:
• Alice is an on-line auction service used by Otto to
buy goods.
• Dave is a drop box for parcels (e.g. a PO box).
• Max is a merchant who sells expensive, tangible
goods at on-line auctions.
• Rachel is a shipping agent, who for a fee receives
parcels on behalf of her clients and re-ships them to
a drop box as instructed by her client.
• Tina is the first target of Otto’s crime; her username
and password for on-line auction Alice are stolen by
Otto.
• Chris is the second target of Otto’s crime; his credit
card details are fenced by Sam.
The scenario proceeds in ten steps as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1 (some details have been omitted):
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1. Otto asks Vera if Sam can be trusted. Vera confirms
this.
2. Otto goes shopping at Sam’s and buys (a) some new
malware, (b) a list of millions of email addresses, and
(c) a credit card number that has been stolen from
Chris.
3. Otto sends a job advert to all emails on the list he
bought from Sam asking for a re-shipper who will be
paid handsomely for each package shipped. Rachel
accepts the job. Otto instructs Rachel to reship all
goods she receives to drop box Dave.
4. Otto sends an email with a malware attachment to
all the emails on the list he bought from Sam. Tina
opens the attachment, and as a result of her naivety,
her user name and password for on-line auction Alice
are sent back to Otto.
5. Otto logs in to the online auction Alice using Tina’s
credentials, and purchases expensive goods from
Max.
6. Otto uses Chris’ credit card to pay Max for the goods.
7. Max ships the goods to Rachel, as requested by Otto.
8. Rachel receives the goods from Max and sends them
on to Dave as instructed by Otto.
9. Otto picks up the goods from Dave, and takes them
to Perry.
10. Perry pays Otto.
Figure 1 shows the 10 actors and the 10 steps of the
transactions described above.
5.2.1 Using the 25 techniques against on-line
auction fraud
There are opportunities to disrupt a complex transaction
such as Otto’s crime. We revisit the ten steps and, in-
spired by the 25 techniques, we suggest one possible pre-
ventive approach for each of the steps:
1. Subvert the verification service, e.g. by poisoning it
with false information. This would make it hard for
Otto to find partners in crime that will not cheat him.
This is an instance of control tools (5).
2. Police the Internet to detect on-line suppliers of
stolen information. This is an instance of strength-
ening formal surveillance (10).
3. Train Internet users like Rachel to warn her against
offers of easy jobs and easy money. This is an instance
of remove targets (11).
4. Train Internet users like Tina not to click on dubious
attachments. Again an instance of remove targets
(11).
5. Improve the analysis of the transactions conducted by
on-line auctions like Alice to spot unusual behaviour.
Otto would presumably buy more goods than honest
buyers, making his behaviour suspect. This is an
instance of screen exits (3).
6. Implement checks on stolen credit card numbers
faster than at present to make it harder for Otto
to pay for his goods. This is an instance of target
hardening (1).
7. Mark goods inconspicuously, so that when a crime
has been discovered it is easier to track the origin of
the goods. This is an instance of identify property
(13).
8. Introduce regular spot checks on the contents of drop
boxes. This is an instance of extend guardianship (6).
9. Place pawn brokers under surveillance to make it
harder for Otto to fence the goods. This is an in-
stance of disrupt markets (14).
10. Could the inland revenue service investigate unex-
pected accumulation of wealth? This is an instance
of alert conscience (23).
Question 19 Which of the suggestions above has the
highest potential?
We conclude the online auction fraud case study by
summarising some related work.
Franklin et al [101] were the first to analyse the pub-
lic data that is visible in an English speaking part of
the Internet services that support the underground econ-
omy. Their results indicate that many specialist service
providers are advertising their wares, including services as
provided by Sam and Vera in our crime scenario above.
Franklin et al suggest a number of low cost attacks to dis-
rupt the market, either by discrediting the buyers and sell-
ers, or by disabling the system that verifies the trustwor-
thiness of the buyers and sellers. Zhuge et al [260] analyse
the Chinese underground economy, which works in a sim-
ilar fashion, except that instead of using IRC channels,
the Chinese underground economy uses bulletin boards
for communication.
To conclude a successful deal, Otto has to invest a sig-
nificant amount of time and money, and he has to face
fierce competition from many other offenders. Contrary
to popular belief, Otto will not get rich fast. Herley and
Florencio argue that Otto and his cronies, who are all
trying to deplete the same finite amount of dollars, suffer
from the tragedy of the commons [133].
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Alice:
Online-Auction
Chris:
Target looses
Credit card
(5) order
Max:
Merchant
(5) order
(6) payment
Dave:
Drop box
Perry:
Pawn broker
(9) goods
Rachel:
Re-shipper
(7) shipment
(8) re-shipment
Tina:
Phishing
Target
Otto:
Offender
(4) credentials
Vera:
Black market
Verification
service
(1) trust
Sam:
Supplier of
crime tools
(2) shopping
(5) order
(3) re-shipment
address
(10) cash
Figure 1: The ten steps of the on-line auction fraud. The two immediate consequences of step (5) have been indicated
by dashed arrows.
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Summarising, there appear to be several opportunities
for new preventive measures against online-fraud. Each of
the opportunities could be investigated, but there is also
a more fundamental issue:
Question 20 How to decide which of the 25 techniques
have the highest potential?
6 Disciplines supporting Cyber-
crime Science
Crime Science requires close cooperation of researchers,
designers, and practitioners to analyse the problem, then
to design and implement solutions, and finally to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of the solutions in a scientific man-
ner. Crime Science is therefore by definition a multidis-
ciplinary field of study, where the Humanities, the Social
Sciences, and the Technical Sciences cooperate [109] in
“Thinking Thief” [104]. In this section we present three
related disciplines in some detail. Firstly, we show some
of the highlights of Computational Social Science, which
offers a number of valuable tools for the Crime Scientist,
and thus also for the Cyber-crime Scientist. Secondly we
review the state of the art in the Economics of Informa-
tion Security and Privacy, to illustrate how one element in
particular of the conceptual framework of Crime Science,
i.e. the Rational Choice Perspective applies to Informa-
tion Security. Thirdly we will summarise the dramatic
effects the rise of cyber-crime as promoted by the Inter-
net has had on the Law, focusing on the deterrent effect
of the Law.
6.1 Computational Social Science
For many years, Natural Science has made heavy use of
computers to collect and analyse experimental and sim-
ulated data, using networks to collaborate. For example
the High Energy Physics community was the first non-
military user of the Internet and thanks to the comput-
ers and networks e-Science is flourishing today [76]. The
development of Computational Social Science follows the
lead of Natural Science. For example Lazer et al observe
that what we all do in our every day life leaves traces on
the Internet [161], thus providing a rich source of infor-
mation that can be mined and analysed. Crime Science
is a member of the Computational Social Science family
because the analysis of crime data is an important aspect
of Crime Science. However, this is not all. Crime Science
emphasizes that each new idea for the prevention of crime
must be properly evaluated, preferably in a well designed
experiment or else in a quasi-experiment or a well designed
analysis of time series. However, there are practical limi-
tations to what can be achieved in an experiment:
• Firstly, some experiments are just too costly. For
example if we believe that changing the street pattern
of a city might reduce crime, then it will be hard to
convince the authorities to change the street pattern
just for a scientific experiment [35].
• Secondly, crime data contains systematic errors.
Sometimes, neither the offender, nor the target,
nor the police have an interest in providing correct
data [119, 158, 218]. For example, a repeat offender
has a vested interest in keeping silent about as many
of his crimes as possible, and a police officer might be
interested in inflating the crime rate to ensure that
the police force will receive more funding [87]. It is
well known that recording policies of the police have
a strong impact on the officially registered volume of
crime, particularly violent crime [200, 249].
Computer based simulated experiments can help to cir-
cumvent these problems [122]. For example, in a computer
based experiment we can change the map of a street pat-
tern. We can also use a simulation based experiment to fill
the gaps in available crime data. However, in a computer
based experiment we do not have access to the actors in-
volved, such as the offender, the target, or the capable
guardian. Therefore, the behaviour of these actors must
be modelled too. Modelling humans is hard, but in the
study of crime we are primarily interested in behaviour
that is believed to be represented by a number of rela-
tively manageable perspectives, such as Rational Choice,
Routine Activity, Crime Pattern Theory. These perspec-
tives can be codified to a certain exetent [31], thus en-
dowing the actors in a simulation with behaviour relevant
for a human actor. With a model of the actors and the
relevant environment we can use a computer to simulate
crime events.
We consider computer based modelling and analysis of
crime as part of Crime Science. However, the term Com-
putational Criminology is also being used; this term seems
to have been used first by Patricia and Paul Brantingham
from Simon Fraser University [38]. We will discuss the
research of the main groups working on crime simulation,
as this is most relevant to our interest in Cyber-crime
Science.
The main idea of crime simulations is to compute the
steps leading to a crime event so that predictions about
real crime and the prevention thereof can be made. Agent
based simulations are the most popular method [87], since
the behaviour of human actors can be codified by way of
rules that determine the behaviour of the agents. The
aim of a simulation is then to infer aggregate behaviour
from the individual behaviour of crime agents. Epstein
argues that the main reason why this works is that the
principle of Bounded Rationality (which is an aspect of
the Rational Choice Perspective) is also the essence of
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generative simulation. Quoting Epstein [92]:
“Situate an initial population of autonomous heteroge-
neous agents in a relevant spatial environment; allow them
to interact according to simple local rules, and thereby
generate – or grow– the macroscopic regularity from the
bottom up.”
The agents of crime include the offender, the target,
and the capable guardian. The simple local rules are pro-
vided by the relevant perspective, for example bounded
rationality restricts the decision of the offender agent to
local knowledge, and ensures that the decision is a ratio-
nal decision that tries to avoid risk. The rules for the
offender steer the latter towards a state where the crime
has been committed, whereas the target and the guardian
try to avoid the crime. The fact that the offender and the
target have opposing goals naturally leads to the sugges-
tion that game theory could be a useful meta-theory, but
we have been able to find only one inconclusive paper in
the related work that suggests this approach [173]. The
spatial environment could be a geographical environment
modelled by a GIS system, or it could be a social net-
work. The macroscopic regularity could be a statement
such as: “burglary is communicable”, which means that
the spreading of burglaries follows the same pattern as a
communicable disease [34].
The strength of generative simulation is that it can be
used to discount inappropriate theories, since a simula-
tion that does not generate the sought after macroscopic
regularity is based on a proposed theory that does not ap-
ply. The limitation of generative simulation is that there
could be many theories that can grow the regularity, so
generative simulation should not be interpreted as a proof
that the theory is the best or only explanation.
Our primary interest is in the ability of generative crime
simulation to answer “what-if” questions. For example
“what would happen to crime rates if we change the layout
of the street pattern?” If the simulation indicates that this
would not be useful, then a costly empirical experiment
can be avoided. To answer “what-if” questions we could
vary the initial configuration or the rules of the agents.
For example the effect of increasing the number of ca-
pable guardians can be studied simply by increasing the
number of agents playing the role of a capable guardian.
However, in practice, the number of configurations that
one can choose from is often huge, so considerable skill
and intuition is required to drive the simulations. As yet
there is insufficient progress in the field to make simulated
“what-if” experiments routine [112].
Any simulation must ultimately be validated with real
data [22]. We have not found many reports of such val-
idations, presumably for reasons of cost, ethics, and pri-
vacy [161].
We have found several strands of work in the literature
on the generative simulation of traditional crime but not
cyber-crime. As the focus of our paper is cyber-crime, we
will only mention briefly what the main representatives
of the related work on traditional crime are. We differen-
tiate related work on the way in which the macroscopic
regularity is specified. Researchers at the Vrije Univer-
siteit in Amsterdam [29, 30, 26, 31, 28, 27, 31] use a
logical approach to the specification of the macroscopic
regularity, where a kind of model checking separates sim-
ulated behavioural traces that lead to crime from those
that do not lead to crime. (The approach is not proper
model checking as there is no exhaustive state space explo-
ration). Researchers at Simon Fraser University in Van-
couver [110, 112, 111, 37, 38] use an interactive approach
towards the detection of the macroscopic regularity, in
the sense that successful simulations exhibit for example
crime hot spots. Crime Pattern Theory [35, 36] forms
the basis of the simulations; hence the focus is on the
spatial and temporal behaviour of the offenders and their
targets. Researchers at the University of Cincinnati [86,
88, 87, 166, 233] and the University of Virginia in Char-
lottesville [47, 49, 48, 50, 126, 125, 162, 163, 190, 252, 253]
use statistical approaches towards the specification of the
macroscopic regularity, such as clustering [48], and data
association [49].
We found only one proposal on agent based simulation
of cyber-crime. Gunderson and Brown [126], from the
University of Virginia propose using the same methods
and tools that are used successfully to predict traditional
crime, without elaborating what the notion of space in
the cyber-world might be.
Computational Social Science is relatively young but
has a lot to offer to Social Science in general and Crime
Science in particular. This leads to the following research
approach:
Approach 21 Use computational simulation as a re-
search method in the study of cyber-crime.
6.2 Economics
There is evidence in the literature that theories from Eco-
nomics can be used to explain aspects of crime. For ex-
ample Simon’s Theory of Bounded Rationality [201] un-
derpins the Rational Choice Perspective that we discussed
earlier, and Ehrlich’s Theory of Participation [89] explains
how law enforcement can have a deterrent effect. It would
be impossible to do justice here to even the tip of the ice-
berg of the Economics literature that applies to crime.
On the other hand since economic thinking is so funda-
mental to human activity we felt that we could not ignore
Economics completely in our discussion on the relation
between Information Security and Crime Science. There-
fore we will review briefly the work of two of the most
prominent researchers in the area, which are Ross Ander-
son who works on the Economics of Information Security,
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and Alessandro Acquisti who works on the Economics of
Privacy. This section will be concluded by a list of sug-
gestions for further research.
6.2.1 Economics of Information Security
Anderson [7, 9] argues that many of the failures of Infor-
mation Security are due to perverse incentives that can
be explained using economic theories, which are in essence
based on the Rational Choice perspective. We discuss two
prominent failures by way of example here: Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and Music piracy. We
conclude by referring to a nice idea from economic theory
to prevent cyber-crime.
To explain the Economics of a DDoS attack, consider
the “tragedy of the commons”, which is set in medieval
England. Since there is plenty of grass on common land,
adding a new animal to the flock of sheep creates ben-
efits to the owner of the new animal without noticeably
disadvantaging any of the owners of the sheep already
grazing on the common. However, as soon as there are
too many sheep, the common land turns into a dust bowl,
thus causing a problem to all commoners. Only regula-
tion by the village headman can prevent the dust bowl
from occurring. Returning to the Internet age, we all find
it beneficial to hook up another computer to the Inter-
net, giving all the benefits of Internet access to the user
of the new computer. As long as the user can access the
Internet, he may be tempted to save the time and money
necessary to keep his software, anti virus data base, and
firewall up to date. The more out-of-date his PC becomes
the more likely it is that it will be hijacked and become
part of a BotNet. If the BotNet grows large enough, it can
be used to take out any number of prominent web sites
by a DDoS attack, thus creating the Internet equivalent
of the dust bowl. Unfortunately, there is no village head
man who can regulate the global Internet, so the question
then becomes: can we still think of incentives for PC own-
ers to make them more difficult to hijack? Could there be
a role for the ISP? More generally the question is:
Question 22 Which economic arguments could be effec-
tive in reducing DDoS attacks?
Much research remains to be done to tackle this issue, and
economic arguments will play an important role.
To explain the Economics of music piracy, Anderson
observes that technology, and thus also Information Secu-
rity, deals with products that have a high fixed but low
marginal cost. For example it is expensive to create a
new chip, software, movie, or piece of music, but man-
ufacturing such products in large quantities is relatively
cheap. In the case of software and content, which are basi-
cally bits, the manufacturing costs (i.e. basically copying
the bits from one medium to another) are close to zero.
As a result many technological products are pirated. To
assess the scale of the problem, some authors have used
economic models to investigate the effects of piracy on
the profitability of technology companies. There are at
least two counteracting effects: one that raises sales and
another that reduces sales. Bhattacharjee et al [23] ar-
gue that music piracy might actually raise sales of digital
music. The reasoning is as follows. First, the pirate man-
ages to draw the attention of a music fan to a particular
song, thus reducing advertising costs to the legal owner.
Second, once the fan discovers that the pirated copy is of
low quality (which is often the case with pirated content),
she may in the end purchase a legal copy. The statistics
published by the music industry on the other hand show
a dramatic fall of music sales over the past decade [149],
which is generally attributed to piracy [259].
Investigating the scale of the piracy problem is one
thing, investigating what can be done to prevent the prob-
lem is yet another. Also here, economic theories can
help. For example, using Buchanan’s economic theory of
clubs [52], Gopal and Sanders [117] assert that deterrent
controls (such as the situational crime prevention princi-
ple “Increase risks”) are capable of raising the profitabil-
ity of a technological product, whereas preventive con-
trols (such as the situational crime prevention principle
“Increase the effort”) cannot. The reasoning hinges on
the fact that deterrent controls reduce the number of cus-
tomers of a pirate (the larger the club the more likely it is
that it will be discovered and shut down), which in turn
increases the fixed cost to the pirate. Since the marginal
cost is close to zero, the scale of the piracy problem can be
reduced only by playing on the fixed cost. Piracy of tech-
nological goods is rife today; hence much research remains
to be done to solve the problem:
Question 23 Which economic arguments could be effec-
tive in reducing piracy?
A good starting point for this research would be the
work of Holsapple et al [137], who provide a comprehen-
sive review of the related work on software piracy from a
Crime Science perspective.
Economic theory is not only useful to explain cyber-
crime, but it provides ideas for solutions too. Self enforc-
ing protocols [214] is such an idea: make it in the interest
of all parties engaging in transactions to remain honest.
A nice example from Bruce Schneier’s August 2009 Cryp-
togram is as follows. We quote:
“The homeowner decides the value of the property and
calculates the resultant tax, and the government can ei-
ther accept the tax or buy the home for that price.”
Self-enforcing protocols already exist when using com-
puters and the Internet for an opinion poll (Online
Polling) [114] and using computers and the Internet
for casting and counting votes in elections (Online Vot-
ing) [54]. Self enforcement is not a solution to all prob-
lems as the fundamental motivation to keep the parties
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in a self enforcement protocol honest is that none of the
parties should know when the protocol finishes [214].
6.2.2 Economics of Information Privacy
Like Information Security, information privacy can be ex-
plained (at least partially) by economic theories. How-
ever, the nature of the economic theories is different from
those applied to Information Security. To see why this is
so, let us first assume that privacy is defined as “the right
to be left alone” [234]. Using this definition, Berendt et
al [21] interview a large number of online users about their
privacy preferences and behaviour. The conclusion of the
study is that online users do not often act in accordance
with their stated preferences. Studies in the real world
have come to the same conclusion [120]. Acquisti asserts
that behavioural economic theories are able to explain our
slightly irrational attitudes towards privacy [2]. Let us ex-
plore first why classical economic theories, which basically
state that “privacy is a tradeoff between the benefits and
costs of sharing and hiding information” fail. First of all,
the benefits of sharing are most obvious, and often lead to
instant gratification. For example, in the real world, most
consumers subscribe to a loyalty program with their su-
permarket. Thus the supermarket knows what consumers
buy and offers in exchange a small discount on selected
purchases. The instant gratification of the discount out-
weighs the potential disadvantages of a complete shopping
profile ending up in the hands of the supermarket or their
business partners [120]. In the online world, we see similar
phenomena. For example participants in social networks
willingly enter an astonishing [123] amount of private in-
formation, including photographs and personal details in
exchange for popularity, or even notoriety [2]. The dis-
advantages of rich profiles ending up in the hands of the
service provider, and any one else who pays the service
provider (such as a future employer) for the information
is largely ignored until it is too late [153].
If users are asked to pay for privacy (rather than to get
paid for giving up privacy) the results are even more dra-
matic. Many anonymising services have been deployed
over the years, requiring payment and support (for in-
stance to generate cover traffic) by the users. Such ser-
vices have not done well, simply because the immediate
costs are too difficult to balance against the long run ben-
efits [3]. As a result of all this, the market of privacy
conscious individuals is small [1].
The conclusion is that behavioural economic theories
are called for, such as “soft paternalism”, which gently
nudge [216] people in the right direction when faced with
a privacy sensitive decision. A suggested research question
would be:
Question 24 Given that people at some stage regret that
they have disclosed private information, would it be pos-
sible to remove that information?
Since we have only scratched the surface of such a vast
field as Economics, even in relation to Information Secu-
rity and Privacy, we cannot offer firm conclusions. Instead
we suggest to:
Approach 25 Use economic methods in the study of
cyber-crime
6.3 Law
New technology has always provided new challenges for
the Law. For example the introduction of the motor car
gave us joy riding, and the introduction of the telephone
gave us obscene calls. The Law continually adapts to face
new forms of crime, and as such has been able to deal
effectively with technology induced crime [40]. However,
the Law cannot be changed abruptly, as law reflects the
values of society. Presently, the Law has not adapted
sufficiently to cope effectively with the large variety of
cyber-crime that the information revolution and in par-
ticular the meteoric rise of the Internet has given us [242].
This reduces the deterrent capability of the Law (as well
as the corrective capability, which is beyond the scope of
the paper. We will explore the reduced deterrent capabil-
ity of the Law first) by analysing the differences between
traditional crime and cyber-crime from a legal perspec-
tive. Then we will summarise a number of, sometimes far
reaching proposals from the literature to update the law
so that it will be able to deal with cyber-crime.
6.3.1 Differences between Crime and Cyber-
crime
At present crime and cyber-crime differ in significant
ways, creating a number of challenges for the Law. We list
those challenges first, focusing on opportunities for new
technology to come to the assistance of the Law.
Some forms of cyber-crime appear to have no pen-
dant in traditional crime. Computers can be used as
an instrument of non-traditional crime in such a way that
some aspects of the crime are no longer covered by the
Law. We give three examples. Firstly, if a computer is
used to steal intangible property by making a perfect copy
of the original, the original is still with its owner, and the
latter may not even notice that a copy has been made.
With traditional theft this is not possible; hence any pro-
vision in the law that requires the owner to have been per-
manently deprived of the object no longer applies. This,
however, is a standard provision in many, if not all legal
systems.
Secondly, denial of service is a social harm that does
not fit any of the categories of traditional offences, in par-
ticular denial of service is not stealing as neither the client
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nor the service provider are actually deprived of anything
other than time [41].
Thirdly, several countries, including the US and
Canada, have enacted legislation that declares virtual
child pornography illegal on the grounds that with modern
technology highly realistic images can be produced that
are almost indistinguishable from photographs. Without
this new legislation, offenders could simply argue that all
their images are virtual images, and therefore there was no
actual harm done to children. However, possession of such
virtual images represents a crime against morality [44].
All three examples represent forms of cyber-crime that
have no pendant in traditional crime, and as such may
need new laws to deal with.
Cyber-crime usually is non-local, traditional crime
usually is local. Crime is usually a local matter that is
best dealt with locally. States have a monopoly on the use
of force over their citizens, and the state has a location
in geographical space. Geographic location is an impor-
tant element of the capability of states to deal effectively
with crime committed by their nationals. However, some
forms of traditional crime are essentially non-local. We
give three examples. The first is provided by piracy of
the high seas, which was tolerated until the world powers
decided that stable commercial relations would be more
profitable than stealing from each other [116].
The second example is provided by piracy of intellectual
property in the 19-th century in the US [116]. Charles
Dickens, whose books were sent by telegraph over the
Atlantic, and which were then printed, and sold in the
US without his permission was one of the first victims of
net piracy [142]. This practice ended when US publish-
ers and authors agreed to bring an end to the ensuing
chaos. This moved the American government to outlaw
net piracy [227].
The third example is cyber-crime, which, like the pre-
vious examples may eventually be dealt with because leg-
islators decide that the cost of cyber-crime is too high for
society to bear. This motivates the following suggestion
for future research [56]:
Question 26 What is the real cost of cyber-crime to so-
ciety?
There are many reports of costs attributed to cyber-
crime. The most widely known is perhaps the series of
Computer Security Institute (CSI) reports, which is now
in its 14-th year [192]. However, the CSI reports are the
result of a questionnaire sent to US businesses, of which
about 10% submits a reply. This is hardly representative
for the world at large, and extrapolating the CSI finding
is likely to overestimate the cost of cyber-crime. Another
approach is to look at the number of prosecutions. For ex-
ample in the UK there have been about 150 relevant pros-
ecutions in the past 20 years [232], which if extrapolated
almost certainly underestimates the cost of cyber-crime.
More research is needed to assess the cost of cyber-crime,
which is made difficult because of the overwhelming de-
sire of victims not to report incidents for fear of loosing
reputation.
There are signs that some governments are already seri-
ously worried about the cost of cyber-crime. For example
the US Department of Defence has recently created the
US Cyber Command to protect US military cyber space.
It is less clear which court has jurisdiction over
cyber-crime than traditional crime. A national
court can only deal with a crime or a criminal if there
is a connection to the court. Usually the location of a
crime, or the nationality of the criminal falls under the
jurisdiction of a specific national court, but other con-
nections are possible too. For example the “Universality
nexus” gives a court jurisdiction over crimes that are con-
sidered by many states as of universal concern, such as
slavery, or war crimes [12]. The case of the Love Bug
computer virus in 2000 is a good illustration of the ju-
risdictional problem [116] for cyber-crime. When Onel de
Guzman released the Love Bug virus from the Philippines,
this was not illegal; hence he could not be prosecuted
in his country. Even though releasing a computer virus
was illegal in the US, where the Love Bug caused a lot
of damage too, he could not be extradited for the simple
reason that extradition requires that the act is punishable
in both countries involved [44]. In response to such issues,
some countries have introduced legislation that gives their
national wide ranging powers. For example, Malaysian
law, by the power of the “Effect nexus” [220] effectively
claims that Malaysian courts have universal jurisdiction
over some forms of cyber-crime [44].
Cyber-crime amplifies the differences in national
law. What is legal in one country might be illegal in
another, complicating the matter of deciding jurisdic-
tion [40]. Especially differences between common law (for
example Continental Europe) and case law (for example
UK, USA) countries are significant. We give two exam-
ples. Firstly, in the early 2000s the FBI developed the
Magic Lantern, which can be installed surreptitiously on
the computer of a suspect. Without the latters knowledge
Magic Lantern captures the keystrokes of the computer
user (such as user names and passwords).The laws of the
US permit the FBI to use Magic Lantern globally, but to
the law of other states this is misconduct of law enforce-
ment [12]. It is not clear whether Magic Lantern has ever
been deployed.
The second example is retailer entrapment, which arises
when a retailer sells a product or service to a customer
who is not entitled to receive these. Examples include
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adult content and gambling services. To avoid prosecution
the retailer should ask the customer to certify their age
and/or their place of domicile. However, it is easy for
the customer to cheat [12]. This leads to a new research
question about technologies (called geo-location) that are
able to determine the geographic location of an offender
a target etc:
Question 27 How to make the information provided by
Geo-location more accurate?
Organized crime relies on strength in numbers,
cyber-crime does can be automatied. Organized
crime requires strength in numbers [39]. For example the
Mafia in the US during the prohibition produced, dis-
tributed and sold liquor illegally, requiring an organised
work force. Computers are such powerful tools for the
automation of all manner of human activity, that a lone
hacker is able to inflict considerable damage, simply by
enlisting more computer power. The damage is limited
only by his imagination and technical skills. For the Law
this implies significant changes, as the concept of organ-
ised crime might have to be redefined for cyber space.
Traditional law enforcement is not as effective
against cyber-crime as against traditional crime.
Sanctioning for traditional crime is efficient in the sense
that law enforcement is able to apprehend enough offend-
ers, thus providing a measure of deterrence that is con-
sidered acceptable to society [40]. However, the strategies
used by law enforcement are not effective to create the
same level of deterrence for cyber-crime. We give two
examples. Firstly, whereas a neighbourhood watch pro-
gram might deter local burglars, an international scammer
would probably not be deterred by any local measures, as
he acts on a global scale. The problem for the law is to
measure the harm caused by a cyber-crime, so that cali-
brated punishment can be imposed.
Secondly, law enforcement is entitled to the propor-
tional use of force, which in the case of real crime might
be used to break locks or to break down doors. However,
in the case of investigating the encrypted contents of the
hard disk of a computer [57], strong encryption would
require a disproportionate amount of force to break the
encryption [226]. Whereas weaker forms of encryption can
be broken using computers and software, strong encryp-
tion cannot be broken in a reasonable amount of time,
and perfect encryption (using a one-time pad) cannot be
broken at all. (We are assuming here that the encryp-
tion is also properly implemented, which is not always
the case [128]). Law enforcement cannot ask the suspect
to hand over a copy of the encrypted original, since that
does not provide any guarantees that the copy and the en-
crypted original are identical. In this case the only option
open is to convict the owner for contempt of court if he
refuses to disclose the encryption key. In the case of a real,
physical vault with a real key, this would not be necessary,
as the vault can always be opened by force. This exam-
ple shows that information technology offers protection of
assets that is unparalleled in the real world.
Summarising, we have shown that there are currently
significant differences between cyber-crime and traditional
crime as far as the law is concerned. In the beginning of
the global Internet era, some believed that a new brand
of Law should be created for cyber space [143]. Now 15
years later, we believe that those differences can be taken
into account by an appropriate development of the Law.
Whether this will always be true is hard to say, however
the essay of Brenner on the subject of Fantasy crime [42]
suggests that even substantial harm leaking from the most
bizarre behaviour in Second Life can be dealt with effec-
tively by the laws governing cyber-crime. It will probably
take many years to increase the efficiency of the Law suf-
ficiently.
6.3.2 Reconciling the differences between crime
and cyber-crime.
Given that the Internet will continue to change our society
at a rapid pace, the task of the legislators is not a simple
one. Here we summarise three approaches that we have
encountered in the literature designed to deal effectively
with cyber-crime. The first two are more or less classical
approaches, whereas the third is more radical.
International treaties International cooperation is es-
sential to improve deterrence in cyber-space. Therefore a
number of treaties have been enacted. The most promi-
nent is perhaps the European Convention on Cyber-crime,
which seeks to harmonise national laws on cyber-crime.
To date the Convention has been ratified by 29 nation
states, with the US as the only non-European country.
This clearly shows the importance that the western world
attaches to the fight against cyber-crime. The ratification
process is a slow one and there is a long way to go, since
there are over 200 nation states world wide [150]. How-
ever, there is hope that like the international treaties on
nuclear and chemical warfare, this treaty will eventually
be able to claim some successes [107].
More power to the police Some states have decided
that the police should be better equipped to gather intel-
ligence and thus to improve the prevention of cyber-crime
by deterrence. Better intelligence allows the police to act
more quickly and on a large scale. For example in the
US the FBI and other government agencies have the pos-
sibility to issue a National Security Letter (NSL) on an
ISP, requesting information about its customers without
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judicial oversight. The NSL is not new but the sweeping
powers bestowed on Government services by the 2001 US
PATRIOT act allows the FBI to make heavy use of its
power [106]. In Europe the data retention directive [213]
requires an ISP to collect and store connection informa-
tion for a period between 6 and 24 months. National
police forces, for example in the Netherlands, make heavy
use of this and other information, often without involving
the courts [229]. Clearly this practice of gathering intelli-
gence without judicial oversight raises severe privacy con-
cerns. This motivates the following suggestion for future
research:
Question 28 To what extent does law enforcement ex-
ceeds its authority in the use of connection data?
Distributed Security Brenner and (Leo) Clarke [43]
propose a radical departure from current law enforcement
to deal with these problems in an enforcement model
called “distributed security”. Centralised (as opposed to
distributed) Law enforcement as it exists today is mod-
elled on the London Metropolitan Police, which was cre-
ated in 1829 by Sir Robert Peel. Before that time, law
enforcement was distributed in the sense that it required
the citizens to contribute to law enforcement. The idea of
distributed security in the cyber-era is to involve individ-
ual users, ISPs, and organizational users in the prevention
of cyber-crime. For example (1) a producer of software
might be held liable for the quality of the software pro-
duced, (2) an ISP might require a government licence to
operate, and (3) a user who fails to maintain the security
of her computer could be fined. To see why in general
distributed security makes sense, we compare the infor-
mation super highway with a regular highway. Driving
an unsafe car may endanger the life of others, and is thus
illegal. In the same vein, using a badly maintained PC on
the Internet could cause damage to others, and could be
declared illegal too.
There are practical issues with distributed security. (1)
Software producers have always argued that their prod-
ucts are too complex to be able to bear liability, and that
liability would chill innovation [43]. (2) Already in 2002
the estimated number of ISPs world wide was 10,000 [135],
hence requiring a massive certification effort, for which
many of the ISP would probably fail. (3) Fining users
who do not properly maintain their computers would be
a gargantuan task, considering that soon the number of
computers connected to the Internet will exceed the size
of the world population.
There are also more fundamental issues with distributed
security. Firstly, the proposal has serious privacy impli-
cations, as it requires information sharing between law
enforcement, individual users, organizational users, and
ISPs. Secondly, distributed security requires intelligence
in the Internet, which by design has all intelligence in the
end points [25].
Finally, distributed security is actually pure Crime Sci-
ence because distributed security asserts that everybody
has a role to play in crime prevention, thus fundamentally
altering the opportunity structure for crime.
Summarising, technological change has presented chal-
lenges to the law before. We believe that like the piracy
issues of the past, a solution will come about if states
agree that the price we pay for cyber-crime is becoming
too high. The problem then becomes one of deciding the
cost of cyber-crime, which is notoriously hard. Finally,
since detection is beyond the scope of the paper we only
mention that Law enforcement requires new tools for dig-
ital forensics [53].
7 Stakeholders in Cyber-crime
Science
Crime Science requires cooperation of all the relevant
stakeholders. We focus on two different types of stake
holders: manufactures of products and our own students.
7.1 Manufacturers
Manufacturers generally consider crime prevention a task
for the police, because manufacturers assume that their
customers do not want to pay for security features. There-
fore, manufacturers are generally unwilling to invest in
crime prevention, unless forced by government to do so.
Governments have good reasons to intervene because the
cost of crime is not simply the replacement cost of a stolen
item. For example the average cost of a simple street rob-
bery is estimated at over 7,000 pounds by the UK home
office, due to the cost of the criminal justice system, re-
duced productivity of the target etc [167].
One of the pitfalls of crime prevention is that it is easy
to alienate the manufacturers by blaming them for crim-
inogenic design [10]. A better way to proceed is to find
convincing arguments to do something about crime, for
example by developing a theft index. In the UK, car theft
became endemic in the late eighties, because it proved
to be easy to defeat the locks. In 1992 the Home office
started to publish an annual car theft index, which shows
which cars are most at risk. This proved to be a powerful
incentive for the car industry to improve the locks [159].
In the following years, car theft was reduced considerably.
While it cannot be excluded that the reduction was due
to other causes, such alternative causes have never been
found, so it is assumed that the car theft index did indeed
cause the reduction in the number of car thefts.
Criminologists at Loughborough University have inves-
tigated theft of mobile phones from a Crime Science per-
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spective. First, the criminogenic properties of the mobile
phone were analysed in detail [240]. The analysis found
several approaches to reduce the opportunity for phone
theft, of which blacklisting of the phone International
Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number appeared to
be a good choice. The problem with this approach is that
the cost borne by the operators to maintain and enforce
the blacklist is not insignificant, particularly when con-
sidering that stolen phones are easily exported to another
country. So naturally, the operators are not keen, and
again a theft index could prove to be a useful tool to per-
suade the operators to spend more effort on the problem.
Due to the necessary data cleaning, developing a theft
index from existing data bases is a labour intensive pro-
cess. A typical problem that still has to be overcome
is that the relevant data base may not be set up to be
used for this purpose. For example once a stolen car is
recovered, the relevant entry in the UK police national
computer database is removed [159]. To obtain the neces-
sary data, researchers had to go directly to the individual
police forces. With a little foresight, this problem could
have been prevented, although the legal implications of
re-purposing data bases must be carefully assessed.
Even if blacklisting is universally enforced, offenders are
often able to change the IMEI number by reprogramming
the mobile phone [147]. Prevention of phone theft is pre-
dicted to become even more important in the future, as
more and more mobile phones are able to make payments
as well [238]. This is where new ideas from Computer Sci-
entists are welcome, especially considering the fact that an
increasing range of products that are IP enabled [90], such
as smart phones. IP enabled TV sets have recently ap-
peared on the market, with IP enabled cars just around
the corner. If Mark Weiser’s vision [237] of Ubiquitous
Computing (a calm technology that recedes into the back-
ground of our lives) becomes true, then at some point in
time every object will be networked. This provides new
tools for the designer against crime such as being able to
register the whereabouts of the product so that a theft in-
dex can be made. Naturally, there are interesting privacy
issues to be taken into account.
The examples above show that we all have a responsi-
bility for crime prevention: for example motorists must
lock their cars; the manufacturer must design and imple-
ment appropriate locks, and the government must make
sure that each party behaves responsibly [159].
7.2 Students
Design products and systems to reduce the opportunity
for crime fun, and young designers are particularly apt
at “lateral thinking” needed to be successful. Gamman
and Hughes [104] present a range of imaginative designs
by their students to prevent pick pocketing. A multidis-
ciplinary course on Cyber-crime Science is probably at-
tractive to students who now go straight into the police
or the security industry [66]. A useful starting point for a
curriculum would be Brooks [45], who creates a mind map
of all the relevant disciplines that deal with all aspects of
security, including physical security, Information Security.
8 Conclusions
Our main conclusion is that the methods from Crime Sci-
ence applied to Information Security lead to a useful re-
finement of Crime Science which we call Cyber-crime Sci-
ence. This refinement provides an array of powerful tools
both from Crime Science and from Information Security
that can be used to prevent cyber-crime.
Cyber-crime can also be prevented by measures focus-
ing on the offender but this is beyond the scope of our
paper. There might be breaches of Information Security
that are merely a nuisance and not crime, and not all
cyber-crime is caused by breaching Information Security.
However we argue that treating a breach of Information
Security primarily as an occurrence of cyber-crime gives
us two complementary opportunities.
The first opportunity is to deploy the rich knowledge
from Crime Science to come to the assistance of Informa-
tion Security. We give two examples:
• Crime Science promotes a crime specific approach
embodied in a number of checklists, such as CRAVED
which we discussed on page 8 but also others, such
as:
– high Value, low Inertia, high Visibility and easy
Access (VIVA) [63]
– Identifiable, Neutral, Seen, Attached, Findable,
Executable, Hidden, Automatic, Necessary, De-
tectable, and Secure (INSAFEHANDS) [240]
– Stealth, Challenge, Anonymity, Re-
connaissance, Escape, and Multiplicity
(SCAREM) [184]
Each checklist helps to design crime prevention mea-
sures. These checklists have proven to be effective
for crime involving tangible objects such as theft of
mobile phones, but only CRAVED has been applied
to information [184, chapter 4];
• The research methodology of Crime Science has
proved its value in traditional crime. We see signifi-
cant opportunities to apply the method also to cyber-
crime. For example, in the phishing case study dis-
cussed in Section 5.1 we suggest how the researchers
could have improved their results if they had known
about Crime Science.
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The second opportunity is to augment the array of
crime prevention techniques from Crime Science with ap-
propriate techniques from Information Security to deal
with cyber-crime.
In Section 3 we cite related work that shows that there
is considerable overlap between existing Information Se-
curity techniques and the 25 generic opportunity reducing
techniques (for example access control as a technique for
target hardening). We have not found techniques from In-
formation Security that cannot be classified as an instance
of one of the 25 techniques. However, there are generic
techniques for which we have not been able to find con-
vincing specific Information Security techniques. For ex-
ample for generic technique Reduce arousal, we only found
the unconvincing specific technique “make shop lifting less
attractive if goods are believed chipped with RFID” [239].
If Information Security indeed overlaps significantly
with situational prevention of cyber-crime, then why have
we found so little evidence of this in the literature? For
example the first edition of Ross Anderson’s excellent and
encyclopaedic book on Security Engineering [6] does not
mention Crime Science. However, the second edition [8]
does mention Crime Science, but only in connection with
physical security. We believe that the role of Information
Security as technology for cyber-crime prevention is as yet
largely unexplored because:
• Information Security researchers are not normally
taught Criminology, nor Crime Science;
• Information Security focuses on the technology,
which is important for Crime Science but the context
is at least as important for the prevention of crime;
• Assessing the effectiveness of crime prevention mea-
sures requires knowledge of Social Science research
methods [84], the prosecution of realistic experiments
for which Computer Scientists are not always well
equipped, and which if embarked on naively run the
risk of problems with the law.
While Computer Scientists appear to have had limited
exposure from the ideas of criminologists, the reverse is
certainly not true. Section 6.1 reviews only the tip of the
iceberg of the papers where Computer Science technolo-
gies such as data mining, simulation, and geographical
information systems are used effectively by Social Scien-
tists.
To bridge the gap between Crime Science and Infor-
mation Security we have identified a number of research
questions for multidisciplinary research teams throughout
the paper labelled Question 1 . . . 26. Here we bring all
questions together. We discuss first the questions ema-
nating from the conceptual framework of Crime Science,
and then follow with the questions arising from the review
of the disciplines closely related to Crime Science.
Routine Activity Approach The opportunity for
crime is most likely to present itself during routine activi-
ties, when (1) a potential offender meets (2) a suitable tar-
get in the absence of (3) a capable guardian. Transferring
preventive measures from traditional crime to cyber-crime
prevention requires some conceptual changes: In the case
of cyber-crime, routine activities include the daily work-
flow of on-line actions of potential offenders, who may
be insiders or outsiders of an organization, or perhaps
we should say who may or may not have specialised ac-
cess. Digital targets may be manipulated remotely after
they have been are stolen. Guardians need some access
and overview of potential targets and therefore need to be
“close” to their target. All of this raises three questions:
• What distinguishes insiders from outsiders (or spe-
cialised access from regular access) in a cyber-
physical world? (Question 1) How can we observe
their routine activities effectively, while preserving
anonymity? What deterrence techniques are avail-
able for these categories and how effective are these
techniques? What about the category of people who
are both insiders and outsiders (e.g. consultants, free
lancers, outsourcing providers)
• What manipulations of e.g. value of stolen digital
goods would be effective in deterring potential at-
tackers of these assets? (Question 2) Would it be
possible to assist digital forensics too?
• What is proximity in a cyber-physical world? (Ques-
tion 3)
Crime Pattern Theory Offenders find opportunities
for crime during the daily journey between home, work,
and leisure. As a result, crime usually occurs in spe-
cific patterns and it is usually concentrated at particu-
lar places, and at particular times, i.e. hot spots. Pre-
vention must therefore target at least these hot spots.
In the cyber-physical world too, potential offenders move
around, both physically (taking mobile devices to places)
and digitally (surfing the web). Identification of hot-spots
in the cyber-physical world is however conceptually diffi-
cult and identifying hotspots may violate privacy rules.
This raises two questions:
• What exactly is a “hot spot” on the Internet? (Ques-
tion 5) What concept(s) of “location” are relevant for
the identification of hot sports in the Internet?
• How can we monitor activity on the Internet to iden-
tify hot spots and still respect privacy? (Question
4)
Offenders who commit a cyber-crime are usually able to
conceal their identities better than for traditional crime.
We believe that mechanisms are needed that enable law
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enforcement to revoke anonymity in cyber-space without
placing undue restrictions on the freedom of law abiding
citizens.
Rational Choice Perspective Human behaviour is
governed by its expected consequences. Criminal ac-
tors thus make cost/benefit tradeoffs of expected conse-
quences. This view is applicable without change to cyber-
crime. The leading research question here is:
• Which cost/benefit tradeoffs do cybercriminals actu-
ally make? (Question 6) Are there different classes
of criminals that make different kinds of tradeoffs?
What role does bounded rationality play?
Some research on this question has already been done but
a lot more work needs to be done.
Repeat Victimization Many victims are repeatedly
victims of the same crime. This is useful knowledge for
taking preventive measures but so far not much is known
about repeat victimization in cyber-crime. This raises the
question:
• What is the extent and nature of repeat victimization
in cyber-crime? (Question 7)
The 25 generic opportunity-reducing techniques
The 25 generic opportunity-reducing techniques of Crime
Science can be applied to reduce the opportunity of cyber-
crime. There are three aspects to this:
1. Applying current results of Crime Science to cyber-
crime
2. Extending this with elements specific to the cyber-
physical world, and not yet studied in Crime Science.
3. Applying the methods of Crime Science to generate
new knowledge about cyber-crime that can be used
for preventing cyber-crime.
We discuss each of these three aspects in turn.
Firstly, the questions related to applying current results
to cyber-crime are:
• Which of the 25 generic opportunity-reducing tech-
niques is most effective in preventing which class of
cyber-crime? (Question 9)
• Which techniques merely displace the criminal activ-
ities, and which ones actually diffuse the benefits of
prevention? (Question 10)
• All questions suggested in the Phishing case study
(Question 13 . . . 18) and the Online auction fraud
case study (Questions 19 . . . 20).
Secondly, the questions related to extending current re-
sults specific to the cyber-physical world should take at
least a new role into account, which is that of the ISP.
For traditional crime there is not a single agent that pro-
motes crime, whereas without the Internet, cyber-crime
would not exist. The ISP should therefore play a key role
in the fight against cyber-crime, and further research is
needed into methods that empower the ISP in the fight
against cyber-crime. This raises the following question:
• What roles can ISPs have in preventing cyber-crime,
and what is the effectiveness of these roles? (Question
8)
More generally, perhaps Cyber-crime requires an exten-
sion of the Crime Science methods:
• Does Cyber-crime Science require an extension of the
set of 25 generic opportunity reducing techniques?
(Question 12)
Thirdly, the questions related to generating new knowl-
edge about cyber-crime would have to look specifically at
forms of cyber-crime that do not have a pendant in the
real world. Two examples of such crimes are fraud in Sec-
ond Life [210], and click fraud [155]. Click fraud works as
follows. An advertiser places an advert on a hosting web
site, which receives a certain amount of money for each
time a visitor to the hosting web site clicks on the advert.
A fraudulent hosting web site then employs inexpensive
labour or automated tools to generate as many clicks on
the advert as possible. Finding measures to prevent these
new forms of cyber-crime will require new research.
• How can we apply the empirical evaluation methods
of Crime Science to cyber-crime? (Question 11)
For example, we believe that the percentage of cyber-
crime that is reported to the police is significantly lower
than the percentage of traditional crime reported to the
police. Companies have a natural inclination to keep
cyber-crime event secret. The lack of adequate statis-
tics is an impediment to the development of the field and
the development of policy. Further research is needed into
methods of collecting relevant cyber-crime statistics.
Finally, it would be useful to have a collection of case
studies for each of the 25 generic techniques applied to
specific forms of cyber-crime. For example, the generic
technique of control disinhibitors which focuses on drugs
and alcohol could perhaps be instantiated by studying In-
ternet addiction. Such a cyber-crime specific collection
could then serve as the starting point for a more system-
atic approach towards solving new forms of cyber-crime.
Disciplines supporting Cyber-crime Science
There are three disciplines that contribute significantly
to Crime Science in general, and to Cyber-crime Science
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in particular. These are Computational Social Science,
Economics, and Law.
Methods and techniques from Computation Social Sci-
ence can be used to simulate crime, and hence cyber-
crime. This does not lead to a particular research question
but to a research approach:
• Use computational simulation as a research method
in the study of cyber-crime (Approach 21)
Economic approaches can be used to understand crime,
for example by taking the bounded rationality point of
view. From an economic point of view some very specific
questions have been raised (Questions 22 . . . 24), all of
which lead to the following research approach:
• Use economic methods in the study of cyber-crime
(Approach 25)
Similarly, legal approaches can be used to understand
crime, and hence cyber-crime. Cyber-crime can be auto-
mated to a degree that cannot be achieved for traditional
crime. This provides a challenge for law enforcement and
the judicial system that must be met by further research.
For example intelligence gathering on the Internet can
be automated just like cyber-crime itself. Based on Ques-
tions 26 . . . 28 we suggest the following research approach:
• Use legal methods to control the cost of cyber-crime
to society.
Finally we believe that there are important opportu-
nities to make Information Security teaching both more
relevant and more exciting:
• Computer scientists would benefit from a basic
grounding in Criminology as well as standard re-
search methods from Social Science;
• Teaching Information Security as a technology to pre-
vent crime creates many opportunities for exciting
student projects. For example we have run a series
of projects where student are asked to steal laptops
from our colleagues at the university [82]. The inge-
nuity and enthusiasm of the student for such projects
is truly amazing, and can be channelled in an effective
learning experience.
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